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ABSTRACT:
The controversial new cocaine vaccine (TA-CD) has the potential to be an extremely 
effective treatment tool for recovering addicts, but it also presents opportunities for non-
therapeutic uses, such as preventing cocaine use in the first place.  It is foreseeable that the 
cocaine vaccine could become a condition of parole or probation, or receiving welfare 
payments, or for employment in certain occupations.  Universal vaccination is also a possibility 
but less likely for political reasons. This article investigates each of these areas of potential use. 
Any setting where mandatory drug testing is currently in place could become a venue for the 
vaccination.
Cass Sunstein and Richard Thaler have recently proposed a new socioeconomic model 
for policy makers to use in making decisions that affect the choices of others: “libertarian 
paternalism.”  Drug laws and vaccine policies are both areas that present thorny issues of 
paternalism, respecting personal liberty, and public safety; the cocaine vaccine, therefore, 
provides an appropriately complex test case for the new model. When “libertarian paternalism” 
is applied, however, it becomes clear that the latent biases of policy makers present unresolved 
problems for the model. The Sunstein/Thaler proposal would be more powerful if it were refined 
to account for these difficult situations, which are the very settings where a new model is most 
needed.
*Asst. Prof. of Law.  The author would like to thank Richard Epstein, Steve Calandrillo, Sandra Carnahan, Charles Rhodes, and 
Tim Zinnecker for their valuable comments, encouragement, and insights on earlier drafts or discussions of the ideas herein.  
Very helpful work came from three student research assistants, Ken Bullock, Billy Skinner, and Patrick Drake.  All errors are the 
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We make bad choices.  And we make choices for other people.  This seems to be an 
unfortunate pair of statements, and it would be just as unfortunate (or maybe worse) in the 
reverse:  We make choices for other people.  We make bad choices. 
These two sentences are more palatable with some qualifiers.  People do not always make 
bad or irrational choices; but neither do we always make optimal choices, even if we always try.1
We sometimes make bad choices.  The word “sometimes” is helpful, because it is more precise, 
but not completely necessary from a grammatical or syntactical standpoint. “We make bad 
choices” can mean either that we always make bad choices, or that we usually do, or that we 
sometimes do – or even that we did so just once, but are likely to do so again.  For the time 
being, it is helpful to keep this ambiguity afloat to illustrate a point.
The same qualifications, of course, apply to the second sentence.  Not all of us routinely 
make decisions for others;2 however, at some point in life, we are forced to make at least some 
choices on behalf of others, whether they are our clients, children, customers, or the students we 
teach or colleagues we supervise.
1
 Whether a decision becomes successful or unsuccessful depends on factors such as having accurate and 
complete information concerning all potential choices, as well as the results of the choices themselves (like whether 
harm comes to innocent third parties).  See HERBERT A. SIMON, ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR: A STUDY OF 
DECISION-MAKING PROCESSES IN ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATIONS 80-81 (3rd ed. 1976).  Simon argues that when 
studied on an individual level, perfectly rational choices are virtually non-existent.  Due to the almost infinite 
number of potential choices or approaches that are possible when facing even the most seemingly inconsequential 
decision, the requirement of complete information for perfectly rational decision-making can never be attained.  In 
order to cope with such an expansive amount of information and possibilities, Simon suggests that the human mind 
creates certain default conditions (or “givens”) in order to make the decision process manageable.  
2
 Categories such as minors and the mentally incompetent are obviously discouraged from making 
decisions for others – moreover, they are often discouraged from making decisions concerning their own allocation 
of resources.  For example, the establishment of the insanity defense in the criminal law acknowledges the 
possibility that in certain circumstances, the human mind can become detached from reality in such a fashion as to 
render the person either unable to comprehend the quality or nature of her actions, or even cognizant that her actions 
were in the wrong.  See Daniel M’Naghten’s Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (H.L. 1843).  These examples serve as yet 
another example of paternalism acting to aid in the creation  of a more efficient society.
The Cocaine Vaccine and “Libertarian Paternalism”
2
These two statements are useful in their simplistic form for illustrating the nature of the 
debate—or better, the tension—between libertarianism3 and paternalism.4  In a simplistic form, 
paternalism assumes one of my first two sentences (we make bad decisions) as the justification 
or rationale for the second (therefore, it is necessary to have those who are more enlightened 
choose things on behalf of others).  Libertarians use the same building blocks with different 
connectors:  we make bad decisions; therefore, it is particularly deplorable that we make 
decisions for others, who will have to live with the unfortunate consequences.  Of course, the 
two approaches have historically occupied opposite ends of a spectrum, or competing schools of 
thought, despite certain similarities in assumptions.
Cass Sunstein and Richard Thaler have proposed a synthesis of these two ends of the 
policy continuum in a well-thought article entitled Libertarian Paternalism is Not an 
Oxymoron.5  Their position is not some middle-of-the-road attempt to find a “balance” between 
two extremes; rather, they offer a model that preserves the core values of each approach by 
breaking the area of application into manageable parts.6  By taking account of human frailties in 
3
 For a functional definition of libertarianism, see DAVID BOAZ, LIBERTARIANISM: A PRIMER 2-3 (1997) 
(defining libertarianism as “the view that each person has the right to live his life in any way he chooses so long as 
he respects the equal rights of others.  Libertarians defend each person’s right to life, liberty, and property-rights that 
people possess naturally, before governments are created.…  [L]ibertarians condemn such government actions as 
censorship, the draft, price controls, confiscation of property, and regulation of our personal and economic lives.”).  
See also DAVID BOAZ, THE LIBERTARIAN READER: CLASSIC AND CONTEMPORARY READINGS FROM LAO-TZU TO 
MILTON FRIEDMAN (David Boaz, ed., 1997).
4
 For an in-depth analysis of modern-day paternalism and selected applications of its principles, see JOHN 
KLEINIG, PATERNALISM 18 (1983) (“Central to understanding paternalism is the conjunction of two factors: an 
imposition and a particular rationale.  X acts to diminish Y’s freedom, to the end that Y’s good may be secured.”); cf
MARY R. JACKMAN, THE VELVET GLOVE: PATERNALISM AND CONFLICT IN GENDER, CLASS, AND RACE RELATIONS
(1994).
5
 Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism is Not an Oxymoron, 70 U. CHI. L. REV.
1159 (2004) (arguing that from a public policy standpoint, governmental and private organizations should attempt to 
positively influence decisions while preserving individual choice).
6 Id. at 1160.  They put it well when they stated the following:
We propose a form of paternalism, libertarian in spirit, that should be acceptable to those who are 
firmly committed to freedom of choice on grounds of either autonomy or welfare.  Indeed, we 
urge that libertarian paternalism provides a basis for both understanding and rethinking a number 
of areas of contemporary law, including those aspects that deal with worker welfare, consumer 
protection, and the family.
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making decisions, a chronic problem for the otherwise appealing rational-actor paradigm,7
Sunstein and Thaler focus the inquiry on which situations make us most susceptible to mistakes,8
rather than on the relative superiority or inferiority of one group (the rulers or the subjects, so to 
speak) at making good choices.  It is the confusing situation, and not the confused person, that 
justifies a limited degree of paternalism.  Sunstein and Thaler justify their position in part by 
showing that paternalism is nearly always present and unavoidable, because of the important 
effects of how choices are framed and which options operate as the default rule.9  Even in forced-
Id. at 1160.  
Further, Sunstein and Thaler urge that their model does not promote an approach that renders the individual 
powerless to make her own decisions: “The libertarian aspect of our strategies lies in the straightforward insistence 
that, in general, people should be free to opt out of specified arrangements if they choose to do so.  To borrow a 
phrase, libertarian paternalists urge that people should be ‘free to choose.’”  Id. at 1161.  However,  the model does 
endorse, if not encourage, some private or public sector involvement in selectively framing the individual’s choices 
so as to provide the optimal choice as the default: “[W]e argue for self-conscious efforts, by private and public 
institutions, to steer people’s choices in directions that will improve the choosers’ own welfare.  [A] policy therefore 
counts as ‘paternalistic’ if it attempts to influence the choice of affected parties in a way that will make choosers 
better off.”  Id. at 1162.
7
 Extensive literature exists analyzing the neoclassical model of the rational actor as it is applied to the law.  
More recently, behavioral economics has synthesized certain elements of psychology, sociology, and economic 
theory to pursue more ‘realistic’ theories on human decision-making.  Behavioral economists have identified several 
fundamental flaws that are exhibited in decision-making on a regular basis.  These flaws include: bounded 
rationality, bounded willpower, and bounded self-interest.  Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein, & Richard H. Thaler, A 
Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471 at 1476 (1998).  
Others challenging the application of neoclassical economic theories to the law have not stopped with the 
rational actor model.  In his often contemptuous, often harsh, review of Posner’s Economic Analysis of the Law
(1973), Leff voices his concerns with the movement as a whole:
[A]s lovely as all of this is, [economic analysis and the law] is still unsatisfactory as anything 
approaching an adequate picture of human activity, even as expressed in that subcategory of living 
loosely called ‘law.’  But one can still admire the intelligence with which it is tried, and the 
genuine, though limited, illuminations the effort provides. … Since its basic intellectual technique 
is the substitution of definitions for both normative and empirical propositions, I would call it 
American Legal Nominalism.
Arthur Allen Leff, Economic Analysis of Law: Some Realism About Nominalism, 60 VA. L. REV. 451, 458-59 
(1974).
8 See Sunstein & Thaler, supra note___ at 1161:
Our emphasis is on the fact that in many domains, people lack clear, stable, or well-ordered 
preferences.  What they choose is strongly influenced by details of the context in which they make 
their choice, for example default rules, framing effects (that is, the wording of possible options), 
and starting points.
9 Sunstein and Thaler dicuss the consumer’s ability to choose between ice cream flavors versus medical 
treatments or financial investments as an example of the effect of perfect information (or the lack thereof) on the 
consumer’s choices as well as demonstrating the how the consumer’s decision-making process must change as the 
choice becomes more complex.  Id. at 1163.  However, upon closer examination this analogy also highlights the 
seeming omnipresence of limited forms of paternalism in virtually every instance of choice:  “There is, in [certain] 
situations, no alternative to a kind of paternalism – at least in the form of an intervention that affects what people 
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decision scenarios with no default choice, framing effects and position biases still have palpable 
effects.10
A very similar proposal has appeared in the University of Pennsylvania Law Review 
recently using the less catchy name “asymmetric paternalism;”11 the coterie of economists, 
joined by Samuel Isacharoff from Columbia Law School, have put forth the argument.  Their 
article focuses specifically on situations where some consumers in a defined group make bad 
decisions, while others do not; a little bit of the right kind of paternalism, they argue, could make 
the poor decision-makers better off without making the rational ones worse off.  Such cases 
warrant limited paternalism because it is so efficient.12
Their argument may not win over many hard-core libertarians (paternalists would 
probably  find less that is objectionable), but for policy makers or commentators it provides a 
useful model for situations where some degree of paternalism is at least tempting, if not 
unavoidable.13  I like the model; it is an overdue contribution to the controversy.   
choose.  We are emphasizing… the possibility that people’s preferences, in certain domains and across a certain 
range, are influenced by the choices made by [others].”  Id. at 1164.  
Sunstein and Thaler go on to explain their position in support of libertarian paternalism:
[W]e make two general suggestions.  First, programs should be designed using a type of welfare 
analysis, one in which a serious attempt is made to measure the costs and benefits of outcomes 
(rather than relying on estimates or willingness to pay).  Choosers should be given more choices if 
the welfare benefits exceed the welfare costs.  Second, some results from the psychology of 
decisionmaking should be used to provide ex ante guidelines to support reasonable judgments 
about when consumers and workers will gain most by increasing options.
Id. at 1166.
10
 Sunstein & Thaler, supra note _, at 1177-79.
11
 Colin Camerer, Samuel Issacharoff, George Loewenstein, Ted O’Donoghue, & Matthew Rabin, 
Regulation for Conservatives: Behavioral Economics and the Case for “Assymetric Paternalism,” 151 U. PENN. L. 
REV. 101 (2003).  My article will refer mostly to the Sunstein/Thaler model (Libertarian Paternalism) because it is 
somewhat more general; the “asymmetric paternalism” model focuses mostly on consumer settings.
12
 Specifically, Camerer, Issacharoff, and Loewenstein argue that in certain instances, the consumer suffers 
from certain decision-making errors, creating a situation in which the consumer’s utility is not fully maximized 
through their choices.  Through the judicious use of paternalistic policies, the down-side risk for the subject group 
decision-makers in these situations can be severely curtailed while the fully-rational decision-makers (in the subject 
class) are not negatively affected – i.e. creating a situation of asymmetric paternalism.  Id. at 1211-12.
13
 Sunstein and Thaler directly address situations where paternalism is unavoidable and suggest that it is in 
these instances where libertarian paternalism can become most beneficial.  Empirical psychological and economic 
research suggests that decisionmakers often suffer from several forms of rationality-limiting behaviors which 
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My contribution, in turn, is to apply the model for the first time to a complex test case: 
the anti-cocaine vaccine.14  In doing so, I hope to show that several unexpected features—some 
problematic—emerge with this model, suggesting a need for refinement.  Rather than furnishing 
an excuse to dismiss the model, I propose the model is sound overall and worth refining to 
address these quirks. 
Pharmaceutical researchers have developed what appears to be a completely effective, 
and completely safe, vaccine against cocaine (and its derivative drugs like crack).15
Administered by injection, the vaccine remains in the bloodstream for an extended time.  When 
the subject ingests cocaine, the anti-cocaine agent bonds with the cocaine molecules—
scientifically, it may be more accurate to say it is a cocaine-loving agent—and the bound 
compound is an inert substance that flushes out of the body.  The person experiences absolutely 
no effects from the cocaine.  There is no high.  There is no overdose.  The metabolism does not 
operate to negatively affect subsequent choices.  “People fail to make forecasts that are consistent with Bayes’s rule, 
use heuristics that can lead them to make systematic blunders, exhibit preference reversals…, suffer from problems 
of self-control, and make different choices depending on the framing of the problem.”  Sunstein & Thaler, supra
note __ at 1168.  It is precisely because of these errors in decisionmaking that paternalism is present in some degree 
in virtually every scenario involving choice.  Furthermore, classic libertarian solutions to imperfect decisionmaking 
cannot combat these problems.  For example, providing the decisionmaker with adequate information is often touted 
as a solution to imperfect decisionmaking.  However, regardless of how independent, unaffiliated, and unbiased the 
source attempts to purvey the information, the decisionmaker may perhaps still suffer from framing and anchor 
effects, thus leading to less-than-ideal choices in the long term.  See Id. at 1183.
14
 Sunstein & Thaler, supra note _, at 1116 et seq..  In their article, Sunstein and Thaler apply their model to 
several test cases, including employee retirement savings plans, organ donation systems, and labor and employment 
law among others; however, these scenarios readily adapt themselves to analysis of this sort.  This paper attempts to 
perform an in-depth analysis of the libertarian paternalist model as it is applied in the controversial social context of 
illicit drug abuse and addiction.  
15
 Barbara S. Fox, Development of a Therapeutic Vaccine for the Treatment of Cocaine Addiction,  48 
DRUG & ALCOHOL DEPENDENCE 153-158 (1997); Peter J. Cohen, Immunization for Prevention and Treatment of 
Cocaine Abuse: Legal and Ethical Implications, 48 DRUG AND ALCOHOL DEPENDENCE 167-74 (1997); M.W. 
Johnson et al., Active Cocaine Immunization Attenuates the Discriminative Properties of Cocaine, 
EXP.CLIN.PSYCHOPHARMACOL 2000 May; 8(2):163-7; Dawn MacKeen, Immunized Against Addiction, SALON 
April 26, 2000 (available at www.salon.com/health/feature/2000/04/26/vaccine/index.html?CP=SAL&DN=110); 
DANIEL STEVEN SCHABACKER, EXPLORING THE FEASIBILITY OF AN ANTI-IDIOTYPIC COCAINE VACCINE (1998); 
BLAINE TEMPLAR SMITH, A VACCINE TO PRODUCE CATALYTIC ANTIBODIES AGAINST COCAINE (1995).
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accelerate.  The vaccine renders cocaine both harmless and useless; any money spent was 
wasted, and cocaine is not cheap stuff.16
The anti- cocaine vaccine originated over a decade ago as a treatment tool for addicts in 
rehabilitation programs.17  It solves the problem of occasional relapses throwing the half-
rehabilitated patient off-kilter and off the program.18  The vaccine has been in use on outpatients 
at the Yale clinic for about three years with no known side effects.19  Each shot lasts several 
weeks, after which the outpatient needs a booster shot.20  It appears to work remarkably well.  
Possible medical-based objections, like the chance that addicts will simply switch to another 
drug, will have a place in the next section.  For the moment, let us assume it works and that there 
are no side effects or risk of harm.
16 See, e.g., OFFICE OF NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL POLICY, WHAT AMERICA’S USERS SPEND ON ILLEGAL 
DRUGS: 1988-2000 2 (2001), available at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/asp/topics.asp 
(“American users spent approximately $36 billion on cocaine, $10 billion on heroin, $5.4 billion on 
methamphetamine, $11 billion on marijuana, and $2.4 billion on other substances….”).
17 See, e.g., O. Bagasra et al., A Potential Vaccine for Cocaine Abuse Prophylaxis,
IMMUNOPHARMACOLOGY (1992) 23:173-79; Kathleen M. Kantak, Anti-cocaine Vaccines: Antibody Protection 
Against Relapse, EXPERT OPIN. PHARMACOTHER (2003) 4(2):213-18 (“The past decade has seen the development of 
several vaccines against illicit drugs.  These include vaccines for producing antibodies against cocaine, heroin, 
methamphetamine and nicotine.  The present focus is on anti-cocaine vaccines, as more research has been conducted 
with these vaccines than [others]….”).  
18
 Thomas R. Kosten et al., Human Therapeutic Cocaine Vaccine: Safety and Immunogenicity, 20 VACCINE
1196-97 (2002).  There are two basic concepts under analysis with the current research concerning antagonist family 
of anti-cocaine vaccines:
The first concept for antagonists is that blocking the effects of high dopamine levels that are 
produced by cocaine might directly reduce reinforcement and euphoria from cocaine use.  The 
second concept for agonists to increase dopamine neuronal stimulation is that dopamine is 
relatively depleted because of down-regulation of the dopamine system after chronic stimulation 
by cocaine abuse and that relapse during protracted withdrawal from cocaine would be less likely 
if this relative depletion was addressed.
Id. at 1196.
19 See e.g., Press Release, Yale University, Dosage Appears to be a Critical Factor in Cocaine Vaccine
(January 28, 2002) available at http://www.yale.edu/opa/newsr/02-01-28-02.all.html; Press Release, Yale 
University, Anti-Cocaine Vaccine Produces Antibodies and is Shown to be Safe in Phase 1 Study Conducted by 
Yale Researcher (March 7, 2000), available at http://www.yale.edu/opa/newsr/00-03-07-01.all.html.
20 Id.
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These developments have so far escaped the attention of the legal community, or at least 
the academy.21  My purpose here is not to herald the advent of a new wonder drug, but rather to 
use it as an intricate illustration of how the Sunstein/Thaler model could work in practice.  
Addiction and vaccinations both raise serious issues for paternalists and libertarians alike.  A 
vaccination for a widespread addiction offers fertile ground for a thought experiment.
The greatest questions arise when a cocaine vaccine is used outside the arena of 
rehabilitation and treatment.22  One can imagine the calls for mandatory vaccinations for 
parolees, as a significant number of them are serving sentences for drug-related (often cocaine or 
crack) offenses.  It also seems likely that some would advocate for its use as a condition for 
receiving welfare payments, to ensure that scarce public resources are not squandered on illegal 
drugs.  There are the inevitable questions of whether we should immunize everyone, or at least 
youngsters, especially if the vaccine were permanent, requiring only one shot.  Finally, the 
cocaine vaccine could become mandatory for employees in certain high-stakes jobs, such as air 
traffic controllers.  Of course, any context in which drug testing is currently in place would be a 
21
 I discussed the cocaine vaccine very briefly in a previous article about welfare programs for addicts. See 
Dru Stevenson, Should Addicts Get Welfare?  Addiction and SSI/SSDI, 68 BROOK. L. REV. 185 (2002) (providing 
that new and different treatment options exist for those alcohol and drug addicts formally covered under the 
SSI/SSDI).
22
 See, e.g., Nell Boyce, ‘No’ in a Needle, U.S. News & World Report, April 28, 2003, at 54.  In an article 
addressing the very issue of vaccinations developed for treatment of addicts being used as a mass vaccination for 
prophylactic purposes, the author cites several examples of the potential benefits and pitfalls:
“[Charles] Schuster… at Wayne State University [developed a vaccine that limited the effects of 
heroin in primate models] wasn’t prepared for what happened next.  ‘I began to get calls and 
plaintive letters from parents all over the world saying please won’t you immunize my child so 
that they won’t become a heroin addict....’  The idea of using a vaccine to prevent rather than just 
treat addiction made Schuster ‘leery’ and he dropped the research.”  
The author goes on to add: “The shots might appeal not to just addicts trying to break a habit but also to 
parents, schools, and governments, raising issues of personal choice and social benefit so knotty that the 
National Academy of Sciences will hold a meeting this week to consider them.”
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possible venue for the cocaine vaccine, as it would serve similar policy goals, but this article is 
confined to a selected set of topics.23
Many readers would find some of these alternatives acceptable, and others not; a few 
readers, who object to any mandatory immunizations, would object to them all.24  At the other 
end of the spectrum, of course, there will be a set of individuals who see cocaine as an 
intolerable scourge on our society; this group may favor using whatever means are available to 
combat what they see as an epidemic.25  The cocaine vaccine administered to the general 
population presents the opportunity to remove the scourge of cocaine completely in one 
generation.
Libertarian paternalism meets its first test at this point.  This article applies the 
Sunstein/Thaler theoretical framework to each of these four possible scenarios.  Each one would 
present significant issues for a policy maker.  What emerges is the (rather stark) realization that 
the policy makers themselves are subject to variations on the bounded rationality that Sunstein 
and Thaler use to justify tinkering with the choices available to constituents (the subject group).  
Certainly these scholars would readily admit this to be the case;26 all humans would be subject to 
23
 For example, there is a growing practice of requiring drug tests of tenants in urban apartment complexes, 
even by private landlords, especially in the context of initial rental applications and lease renewals.  The practice has 
not been litigated on constitutional grounds so far, but the legality of the practice is a topic of controversy.  See, e.g.,
Robert J. Aalberts, Drug Testing Tenants: Does it Violate Rights of Privacy? 38 REAL PROP., PROBATE & TRUST J. 
479 (2003); David Lang, Note, Get Clean or Get Out: Landlords Drug-Testing Tenants, 2 W ASH. U. J.  L.& POL’Y
459 (2000).  This article does not address the possible uses of the cocaine vaccine in landlord-tenant contexts, 
because space demands require focusing on more likely applications.
24
 This was the argument of the citizens in Jacobson v. Massachusetts 197 U.S. 11 (1905) (holding that it is 
within the power of a state to impose regulations mandating vaccinations, and the mandate does not violate the 
individual’s rights as set forth in the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution), and  Zucht v. King, 
260 U.S. 174 (1922).
25
 For the last several years, apart from the criminal justice system, the primary point of attach in the War 
on Drugs has been attempts at crop eradication by aircraft flying over the Andes Mountains.  See, e.g., Daniel Tyler 
Cook, The Case for Coca and Cocaine: Bolivia’s March to Economic Freedom, 13 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 57, 79 
(2004) (arguing that the crop eradication program is unfairly costly to Bolivian farmers, who depend on the crop 
financially).  The cocaine vaccine may prove more effective and less expensive if the same policy goals driving crop 
eradication control the decisions about widespread usage of TA-CD.  
26
 Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 5, at 1200 (acknowledging the bounded rationality of policymakers while 
providing a rationale supporting libertarian paternalism).  
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bounded rationality in varying degrees.27  But the four uses for the cocaine vaccine will show, I 
hope, that those in the paternalist driver’s seat are subject to particular forms of bounded 
rationality that are unique to their position; the subjects suffer from a very different set of issues.  
Sunstein/Thaler’s model has guidelines for avoiding abuses of power, but not for taking these 
more subtle influences into account.  
Part II of this article gives the reader more background on the cocaine vaccine itself.  
This information will be interesting to some readers, but is admittedly not entirely necessary for 
the sake of a thought experiment.  I could have simply assumed a cocaine vaccine hypothetically 
to make the same point; but I think the example is more interesting if it is true to life.  
Part III discusses the issues of mandating the vaccine to parolees, or at least those with a 
history of drug abuse.  Courts already order drug testing for many of those released on parole, 
probation, or supervised release;28 and some courts, especially the new drug courts popping up in 
some states, regularly order defendants into treatment programs;29 this would naturally bear upon 
the issue of a vaccine.  I conclude fairly quickly that Sunstein/Thaler’s model would allow for 
27
 I use the term “bounded rationality” noncommittally. I find rather plausible Richard Posner’s argument 
that the socioeconomist’s examples of irrationality or bounded rationality are simply semantic differences for 
describing perfectly rational decisions made with bad information or that will have bad repercussions.  As I am 
partially convinced that this is indeed a semantic difference, there seems to be relatively little harm in using the 
phrase “bounded rationality” for convenience, even if it really means something like “unfruitful rationality.”  For a 
detailed analysis of “bounded rationality” as it was originally described in the human decision-making process, see
generally HERBERT A. SIMON, REASON IN HUMAN AFFAIRS (1983). 
28
 Statutory support for drug testing as a condition of supervised release can be found in the United States 
Code:
The court shall also order, as an explicit condition of supervised release, that the defendant refrain 
from any unlawful use of a controlled substance and submit to a drug test within 15 days of 
release on supervised release and at least 2 periodic drug tests thereafter (as determined by the 
court) for use of a contr
olled substance. The condition stated in the preceding sentence may be ameliorated or suspended 
by the court as provided in section 3563(a)(4). The results of a drug test administered in 
accordance with the preceding subsection shall be subject to confirmation only if the results are 
positive, the defendant is subject to possible imprisonment for such failure, and either the 
defendant denies the accuracy of such test or there is some other reason to question the results of 
the test.
18 U.S.C. §  3583(d) (2000).  See also Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Ass’n. 489 U.S. 602, 617-20 
(1989)(holding that no Fourth Amendment right is violated through random workplace drug testing)
29 See 18 U.S.C. §  3583(d) (2000).
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mandatory vaccinations for this group; but this stands in contrast to the likely result for some of 
the other groups.  I suggest this is because parolees, as convicts, are deemed to have forfeited 
some of their rights to personal autonomy; a retributive-type impulse would influence policy 
makers or corrections officials to take more liberty with their paternalism.  Whereas the other 
limitations on parolee autonomy are conceptually related to the institution of parole (there must 
be some monitoring, efforts to re-integrate the convict into the community, etc.), these are 
explainable in terms of purely utilitarian and practical concerns.  While some utilitarian ends 
may be served by immunizing parolees (and those on probation), I argue that a heavy morality-
based judgmentalism, perhaps justified but still nonutilitarian, operates as a ghost in the machine 
of the libertarian paternalist model.
Part IV will discuss welfare recipients.  In this setting, contrasted with the convict model, 
I argue that decisionmakers will be influenced by deep-set values of reciprocity; a feeling that 
the beneficiaries of the public largess should be grateful enough to willingly forfeit some of their 
autonomy or bodily integrity30 and submit to the vaccination.  Although there are utilitarian 
30
 This article does not address constitutional issues that could arise if the cocaine vaccine were mandatory 
for certain sections of the population.  Certainly it is of utmost importance whether the constitution bears on these 
issues, but at present it is not clear that it does.  Mandatory vaccinations against diseases, even where criminal 
sanctions are threatened for those who refuse, do not violate the Constitution, according to the Supreme Court.  See 
Jacobson v. Massachusetts 197 U.S. 11 (1905).  This would seem to settle the question of a right to “bodily 
integrity” that involves the refusal of healthful shots.  Clearly, however, bodily integrity is a constitutional concern 
in other areas, such as abortion and birth control rights, forced blood tests of inmates, etc. This means that bodily 
integrity (usually treated as a subcategory of the right to privacy, although sometimes treated as its own grounds of 
substantive due process) is a concern in general, but for some reason is inapplicable to mandatory vaccinations 
against disease (i.e., the public health concerns simply outweigh the privacy concerns).  The uncertainty about the 
constitutional status of mandated cocaine vaccines, of course, lies in the fact that it is a vaccine against an affliction 
that is somewhat voluntary, unlike the vaccines against biological pathogens (germs) that were the subject of the 
early Supreme Court cases on the subject.  In other words, the cocaine vaccine shares with other vaccines the fact 
that it addresses serious public health concerns, and is a safe, healthful, prophylactic measure against a socially 
costly malady (say, addiction).  It is distinguishable in that it combats something that is not “caught” inadvertently,  
like polio or smallpox.  To the extent that the similarities with traditional vaccines carry the analysis, it is likely that 
no constitutional issues will be applicable.  Conversely, to the extent that the cocaine vaccine is viewed more as an 
anti-drug weapon (in the same category as random employee drug testing, for example), mandatory vaccination 
could become a hot constitutional question.  At the present time, that seems to be all there is to say about the 
constitutionality of the cocaine vaccine: mandatory vaccines are constitutional, but the cocaine vaccine might be 
treated as a new exception to the rule.  The issue has not been litigated, but it surely will be if the vaccine becomes 
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arguments for requiring the cocaine vaccine for this group (ensuring efficient use of public 
resources, etc.), I argue that the vaccine would be mandated instead because of a tit-for-tat 
against the individuals who might possibly refuse to get the vaccine voluntarily despite their 
dependence on state assistance.
Part V will address the possibility of universal vaccination, or at least of vaccinating 
those who are at the age of highest risk for beginning drug use.  Here the situation is complicated 
by the fact that the age of majority occurs around the same time; the way this would be handled 
by a policymaker would be different if the subject group were seventeen-year-old students as 
opposed to eighteen or even twentysomethings.  I argue that this step is the least likely to be 
taken, even though greater utilitarian arguments could be made for immunizing this group (costs 
of the vaccine aside) than the previous two.  In addition, the Sunstein/Thaler model might argue 
more strongly in favor of immunizing members of this group because of their age and greater 
vulnerability to bounded rationality in their decisions (lack of wisdom and experience).31  Still, 
policymakers are less likely to exercise libertarian paternalism in this case because of their close 
identification with the subject group.
Part VI discusses air traffic controllers.  This subject group presents special issues for 
libertarian paternalists because of the high stakes involved in the decisions of the group 
members; hundreds of lives may be at stake in each of these decisions. At the same time, this 
mandatory for any group.  Bodily integrity, then, is really a reference to the potential constitutional questions, and is 
generally outside the scope of the discussion about bounded rationality for the two poles of decisionmakers in a 
paternalist-libertarian analysis.
Almost all states voluntarily allow religious exemptions for vaccinations, so First Amendment challenges 
to vaccines have not reached the Supreme Court.  Religious exemptions are more relevant to the questions of 
paternalism and libertarianism, and Parts IV-VI of this article will deal with these issues as they arise.
31
 Again, assuming there are no immediate side-effects or long-term deleterious effects, in which case the 
costs incurred by the rational actor would dramatically increase, undermining the goals of libertarian paternalism.  It 
is important to remember that the fundamental goal of the libertarian paternalism model is to create policy situations 
where boundedly rational decisionmakers, suffering under certain limitations which affect their ability to make 
rational choices, are placed in a position to make the best choices for themselves with the least amount of 
interference from controlling authorities.  
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group highlights the problems with the model with regards to the public-private interface; air 
traffic controllers and those in similarly high-stakes fields (pilots, 911 dispatchers, emergency 
room doctors, etc.) may be required by private employers to submit to the vaccinations; the 
question then is how state policymakers should monitor and regulate the libertarian paternalism 
of the private sector.  This reveals that the model must be refined to have a two-tiered approach: 
policymakers making choices about what choices the employers should leave to the employees, 
and what choices should be made by the management; and of course, what choices should be 
made by the policymakers themselves that “pass through” the private-sector management.  
Part VII summarizes the findings and ties them together as a conclusion. There are 
certainly other topics that could be addressed—like the potential the vaccine has for undercover 
drug agents, who could now partake with the targets of sting operations without any personal 
bodily effects—but these are areas for further research.  This is not intended as a criticism or 
rejection of the Sunstein/Thaler model, but rather as an exercise showing areas that need further 
development. 
II. BACKGROUND
It began with rats.32  Rats, as a rule, like cocaine, at least when they are given the 
opportunity to try it.  Lab rats were administered samples of cocaine; laced feeder bottles were 
then made available in their cages, which the rats can use themselves, alongside the usual water 
bottle, etc.  It does not take long for rats to learn to self-administer the cocaine; they do so 
32 Bagasra et al., supra note _, at 173; see also, M.R.A. Carrera et al., Suppression of Psychoactive Effects 
of Cocaine by Active Immunization, NATURE (1995) 378: 727-30; B.S. Fox et al., Efficacy of a Therapeutic Cocaine 
Vaccine in Rodent Models, NATURE MED. (1996) 2: 1129-32; Kathleen N. Kantak et al., Evaluation of Anti-Cocaine 
Antibodies and a Cocaine Vaccine in a Rat Self-Administration Model, PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY (2000) 148: 251-
62.
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increasingly when given the opportunity, eventually manifesting symptoms of full-blown 
addiction.
The cocaine vaccine is made with a cocaine (or cocaine-like) molecule that is attached to 
a jumbo-sized protein.33  Whereas a cocaine molecule is tiny (even for molecules, but especially 
compared to proteins) and can slip through the blood-brain membrane, allowing its euphoric and 
cognition-distorting effects to work, the oversized baggage of the giant attached protein keeps 
the new molecules from reaching their usual cerebral destination; they stay in the blood for the 
time being.  The attached proteins also make a big enough target for the immune system to spot 
and then attack.  Antibodies form in the blood designed to latch onto any foreign bodies with a 
molecular footprint contoured like the original tiny molecule—surface features shared by regular 
street cocaine. When cocaine enters the system, there is an ample supply of antibodies waiting to 
attack it.  When the antibodies produced by the immune system latch onto the ingested cocaine 
molecules, it prevents their uptake into the brain, “obliterating the euphoric rush”34 that normally 
motivates consumption in the first place.
The rats stop self-administering.35  Despite their manifest addiction, and previously 
voracious appetite for the cocaine-laced fluid from the bottle, their interest drops off completely 
after the shots.  Imbibing does them no good, and their cravings are not continuously re-
stimulated through ingestion (cocaine has the property of self-perpetuating cravings for it).  The 
rats experience no negative side effects.36
33
 Kosten et al., supra note _, at 1197 (proteins in general are very large molecules, at least compared to 
cocaine or many others.  The protein used is recombinant cholera toxin (rCTB), widely used in similar settings and 
considered safe for humans).  “Jumbo-sized” is used mostly to help the reader picture the relative size of the protein 
compared to the cocaine molecule, which is far too small for the body’s immune system to identify and attack as a 
pathogen. Of course, all of these molecules are microscopic, including the proteins.
34 Id.
35
 Kathleen M. Kantak, Vaccines Against Drugs of Abuse: A Viable Treatment Option, DRUGS (2003) 63: 
344-45.
36 Id. at 344.
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The same process works remarkably well with humans; at least in clinical trials so far.37
The trials have administered the vaccine to test groups in a series of three or four shots over a 
period of a few weeks;38 the patients retain sufficiently high levels of antibodies for two to four 
months thereafter, with trace amounts lingering for almost a year.  The real anti-cocaine effect, 
however, seems to wear off after the first three or four months.  Testing continues at locations 
like Yale University.
The vaccine formulation researchers settled on for now is called TA-CD.  Xenova, a 
British pharmaceutical conglomerate, plans to take TA-CD to market in the foreseeable future 
and holds the appropriate rights for this.39  There are no known adverse side effects for humans 
from TA-CD itself; most subjects reported that the shots hurt or caused temporary soreness 
where the needle struck, and a few subjects develop minor redness or muscle twitching at the site 
of injection for a day or so.  These symptoms are fairly typical of intramuscular injections 
generally and have not been blamed on the TA-CD itself.40   The results are very promising: 
subjects report decreased cravings, avoidance of relapses (i.e., ingesting cocaine), and progress 
in curing addictions.  Further tests are planned.41
A few caveats apply.  First, the researchers themselves forese e the possibilities for what 
they call “off-label” (non-therapeutic) uses of the vaccine, like those discussed in the remainder 
of this article, and they are almost uniformly opposed.  The vaccine was developed as a treatment 
37 Id. at 345.
38
 Kantak et al., supra note _, at 216.
39 Id. at 216.
40
 Kosten, et al., supra note _, at 1200.
41
 Kantak, supra note __, at 345.  Initial findings are now available for the Phase II clinical trials of the TA-
CD anti-cocaine vaccine, yielding encouraging results.  
Most recently, Xenova Group indicated in October 2003 that the Phase IIb study was initiated, utilizing a 
randomized, placebo controlled trial, involving 132 test subjects.  The goal of the Phase IIb study is to determine the 
vaccine’s efficacy “and to determine appropriate end-points for a Phase III study.”  Press Release, Xenova Group 
plc, Xenova Initiates Phase IIb Clinical Trial for Anti-Cocaine Vaccine (October 24, 2003), available at
http://www.xenova.co.uk/PressReleases/pr_20031024_01.html.
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tool to complement a full-service rehabilitation program.  Moreover, it has been tested only in 
this setting; the subjects have all been recovering cocaine addicts already trying to quit.  The 
researchers tend to work within the rehabilitation milieu, not epidemiology or immunology; and 
they insist that the vaccine’s effectiveness can only be ensured by the patient’s willingness to 
participate in an overall treatment program (i.e., counseling) and motivation to overcome her 
addiction.42  This is a bit of a bald assertion, of course; no one has tested the vaccine on 
unwilling subjects (for obvious ethical reasons), and it is not clear from a biological standpoint 
why the vaccine would not work the same regardless of the recipient’s attitude. 
Another caveat:  the vaccine is only temporary, meaning that ongoing immunity to 
cocaine, at least given the current state of the science, would require repeat shots every three or 
four months.43  This presents issues of cost as well as logistics of maintaining sufficient supplies.  
Right now only Xenova has plans to manufacture and distribute the vaccine; there will be a de 
jure monopoly, at least temporarily, and the risk of product elimination if the sole producing firm 
should fail.  It is not clear if insurers will cover the vaccine injections indefinitely (if they are 
indeed needed indefinitely) for therapeutic uses, and it is a matter of pure speculation who would 
bear the costs for non-therapeutic uses.  It is not even clear what the costs would be.  Repeat 
shots also present insurmountable logistical problems with certain non-therapeutic uses, like 
universal immunization.  
The fact that the tests have involved three or four shots up front deserves mention.  
Presumably, this was done as a matter of caution; TA-CD is a new product, still in its testing 
phases, and prudence would counsel in favor of small doses that build up the amount of 
antibodies in the bloodstream, so that adverse effects can be monitored at each stage, with less 
42
 A. M. Washton & N. Stone-Washton, Abstinence and Relapse in Outpatient Cocaine Addicts, J. 
PSYCHOACTIVE DRUGS (1990) 22:135-47.
43 See Press Release, Yale University, supra note ___; Kantak et al., supra note __, at 215.
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risk of drastic harm.  As confidence builds that the vaccine is safe and that subjects can tolerate 
higher doses at once, the number of shots required may decrease, hopefully to one.  
The same principle, of course, applies to the duration of the vaccine.  Clinical tests so far 
have used very conservative dosages as a precaution against side effects that would be 
overwhelming.44  As confidence builds regarding the permissible size of a dose, and the ability 
of individual subjects to tolerate larger doses, the inoculation effect may last longer.  This is 
speculative on my part, of course, but not unreasonable.  A stronger dose that lasts longer would 
change the logistical calculation for non-therapeutic uses as well as the cost and supply issues for 
regular therapy.  For purposes of this article, I assume conservatively that when the vaccine is 
brought to market it will be in a single-shot form, but enduring only four months or so.  This 
seems reasonably close to the present state of the science.  If the science changes, of course, it 
could affect any conclusions drawn in the following discussion.  This disclaimer could tilt in 
either direction: the vaccine may be more adaptable to widespread non-therapeutic uses, or less 
so.
There is a commonly voiced concern that is probably overstated: unwilling subjects 
might simply ingest enormous quantities of cocaine in an attempt to overcome the vaccine.  
There is some disagreement in the literature so far about whether this would even be possible; it 
would certainly be costly, and the cost of supersized doses of cocaine would deter some 
consumers from trying.  The vaccine would probably serve as an antidote as well as a killjoy; 
that is, the risk of overdose is lowered to the extent that the vaccine supply in the bloodstream 
attacks the incoming cocaine molecules.  There are no reported cases of test subjects trying to 
44 See Kantak et al, supra note __, at __.
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overwhelm the vaccine in their systems by ingesting extraordinarily large quantities of cocaine; 
then again, they were willing subjects.45
The researchers who developed the vaccine and are running the ongoing tests have the 
best (perhaps only) first-hand knowledge of the vaccine’s uses and limitations.  They also have a 
natural bias: it is reasonable for researchers to be concerned about the media sensationalizing 
possible non-therapeutic uses, because it could end up killing the project, pulling the plug on 
funding for further testing.  It is also reasonable for those with careers in drug counseling and 
rehabilitation programs to feel threatened by a “quick-fix” approach to addiction or substance 
abuse generally; it contradicts the working paradigm of their profession and threatens to 
undermine enrollment in (or coverage for) treatment programs.46
The cocaine vaccine was developed as a treatment for addiction; its possible non-
therapeutic uses would mostly be prophylactic measures to prevent the opportunity for new 
addictions to develop.  Some background discussion about the nature of addiction, therefore, is 
warranted.
There are different schools of thought about the nature of addiction.  Those in the 
treatment community generally conceive of addiction as a “disease” and focus on the addict’s 
inability—in most cases—to kick their habit on their own.  The “disease” school itself tends to 
have some adherents who focus mostly on psychological dependency for their model of 
45 See Washton & Stone-Washton, supra note ___.
46
 The researchers also have a concern that traces of the vaccine remain detectable in the patient’s urine for 
up to a year after the last shot.  Patients who successfully complete rehab programs and try to re-enter the workforce, 
therefore, could encounter problems when subjected to on-the-job drug testing; even though their systems would be 
clean from cocaine, drug testers would be able to spot the vaccine and would know the individual went through a 
rehab program, presenting privacy concerns for program administrators.  Obviously, this privacy problem would be 
moot if the vaccine were universal.  For an excellent discussion of the potential legal, ethical, and sociological harms 
associated with the anti-cocaine vaccine, see Peter J. Cohen, Immunization for Prevention and Treatment of Cocaine 
Abuse: Legal and Ethical Implications, DRUG AND ALCOHOL DEPENDENCE (1997) 48: 167-74. 
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addiction47 and others who focus instead on the physiological chemical dependency. 48  Of 
course, many treatment programs try to incorporate both, providing counseling and group 
therapy as well as pharmacological assistance, such as methadone or antidepressants.  The 
language employed by those who embrace the disease model often suggests that the addicts’ 
continued consumption is involuntary. 49
The “behavioralist” school tends to be on the opposite end of the continuum from the 
disease model; behavioralists argue that none of the addict’s behaviors are “involuntary” in the 
47 See, e.g., AVRAM GOLDSTEIN, ADDICTION: FROM BIOLOGY TO DRUG POLICY (OXFORD UNIVERSITY 
PRESS 2001); DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS, FOURTH EDITION (DSM-IV) 176ff 
(AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION 1994). The the DSM-IV presents a detailed system for diagnosing and 
categorizing Substance Dependence Disorders generally.  The Substance Abuse Disorders are all classified as 304.–, 
with the suffix identifying which substance is the object of the addiction. The basic definition of an addiction, or 
Substance Dependence Disorder, is as follows:
The essential feature of Substance Dependence is a cluster of cognitive, behavioral, and 
physiological symptoms indicating that the individual continues use of the substance despite 
significant substance-related problems.  There is a pattern of repeated self-administration that 
usually results in tolerance, withdrawal, and compulsive drug-taking behavior. A diagnosis of 
Substance Dependence can be applied to every class of substances except caffeine.  The symptoms 
of Dependence are similar across the various categories of substances, but for certain classes some 
symptoms are less salient, and in a few instances not all symptoms apply (e.g., withdrawal 
symptoms are not specified for Hallucinogen Dependence).  Although not specifically listed as a 
criterion item, “craving” (a strong subjective drive to use the substance) is likely to be experienced 
by most (if not all) individuals with Substance Dependence.  Dependence is defined as a cluster of 
three or more of the symptoms listed below occurring at any time in the same 12-month period.
Id. at 176.
The DSM-IV requires for that at least three symptoms from a list of seven possibilities be present during 
the same year: 1) tolerance (indicated by either a need for increased amounts or a diminished effect from using the 
same amount); 2) withdrawal (which can take different forms); 3) the substance is often taken in larger amounts or 
over a longer period than is intended; 4) there is a persistent desire or unsuccessful attempts to cut down or control 
substance abuse; 5) a great deal of time is spent in activities necessary to obtain the substance, use the substance, or 
recover from its effects; 6) important social, occupational, or recreational activities are given up or reduced because 
of substance abuse; and 7) the substance use continues despite knowledge of having a persistent or recurrent 
physical or psychological problem that is likely to have been caused or exacerbated by the substance. Id. at 181.
48 See, e.g., J.D. Jentsch and J.R. Taylor, Impulsivity Resulting from the Frontostriatal Dysfunction in Drug 
Abuse: Implications for the Control of Behavior by Reward-Related Stimuli, 146(4) PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGIA 373-
90 (Oct. 1999); George F. Koob and Michael Le Moal, Drug Addiction, Dysregulation of Reward, and Allostasis, 
NEUROPSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY 24:9-129, 2001; T.E. Robinson and K.C. Berridge, Incentive-sensitization and 
Addiction, 96(1) ADDICTION 103-14 (January 2001).
49
 Of course, the treatment community, and the larger medical community in general, has some self-interest 
in labeling addiction as a “disease;” insurers require the appellation before disbursing funds to reimburse the costs of 
rehabilitation programs. Noting that sometimes vested interests and professional agendas contribute to the stances 
taken on defining the problem, a federal district court in Granville House Inc. v. Dept. of Health & Human Services, 
550 F.Supp. 628, 632 (Minn. 1982), stated,  “On one level, the debate appears to take the form of turf skirmishes.   
The American Medical Association (AMA), since 1957, has classified alcoholism as a physical disease.   The 
American Psychiatric Association (APA), in the Third Edition of its Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders (DSM-III), lists alcoholism as a mental disorder.”
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technical sense of the term; seizures, reflex actions (like blinking), or possibly somnambulism 
are true “involuntary” actions.50  Cocaine addicts, in contrast, take conscious steps to purchase 
cocaine and will seek out a dealer if their usual supplier disappears.51  They self-administer the 
drug and cloister or hide—often cleverly—their supply and consumption from authorities.  
Empirical evidence suggests that addicts respond to market forces such as price increases and (in 
the case of cigarettes) taxes on the product.52  Addicts exhibit more self-control or ability to 
abstain in experimental programs that provide increasing cash rewards each week for clean urine 
tests.53  All of these factors tend to argue against addiction as an involuntary activity and hence 
are used as arguments against the “disease” model.  The United States Supreme Court officially 
adopted this view of addiction in at least one case,54 but in another case the Court explicitly held
50 See, e.g., Herb Fingarette, The Perils of Powell: In Search of A Factual Foundation for the “Disease 
Concept of Alcoholism,” 83 HARV. L. REV. 793 (1970).
51
 Critics of the “disease” model, with its focus on the involuntary nature of addiction, often point to the 
fact that most substance abusers never develop serious dependency problems.  Moreover, many who suffer from 
addiction simply rehabilitate themselves at some point through a process of tough choices and some changes to their 
surroundings.  An oft-cited anecdote recounts how soldiers returning from Vietnam simply abandoned their heroin 
addictions upon their return to civilian life. See Fingarette, supra note __, at 793 et seq.
52 See Gary Becker and K.M. Murphy, A Theory of Rational Addiction, 96 JOURNAL OF POLITICAL 
ECONOMICS 675 (1988); Becker and Mulligan, The Endogenous Determination of Time Preference, THE 
QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS 112(3), 729-758 (1997), reprinted in GARY BECKER, ACCOUNTING FOR 
TASTES 50-118 (1996).  Although Becker is clearly in the economic or rational-actor school, his conclusions have 
significant overlap with the behavioralist approach.
53
  Jennifer Rothflieisch et al., Use of Monetary Reinforcers by Cocaine-Dependent Outpatients, 17(3) J. 
SUBST. ABUSE TREATMENT 229-36 (1999); Elias Robles et al, The Brief Abstinence Test: Voucher-Based 
Reinforcement of Cocaine Abstinence,  58 DRUG & ALCOHOL DEPENDENCE 205-12 (2000); Mark P. Reilly et al., 
Impulsivity and Voucher Versus Money Preference in Polydrug-Dependent Participants Enrolled in a Contingency-
Management-Based Substance Abuse Treatment Program, 19 J. SUBST. ABUSE TREATMENT 253-57 (2000); 
Elizabeth Katz et al., Reinforcement-Based Outpatient Treatment For Opiate and Cocaine Abusers, 20 J. SUBST. 
ABUSE TREATMENT 93 (2001); Suzette M. Evans, et al., Smoked Cocaine Self-Administration in Females and 
Voucher Incentives for Abstinence, 10 J. SUBST. ABUSE 143-62 (1998); Michael Kidorf, et al., Increasing 
Employment of Opioid Dependence Outpatients: And Intensive Behavioral Intervention, 50 DRUG & ALCOHOL 
DEPENDENCE  73-80 (1998) (methadone access made contingent upon securing employment, as opposed to 
monetary rewards).
54
  The Supreme Court has noted on several occasions that “alcoholism has too many definitions and 
disease has practically none.” Powell v. State of Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 522 (1968) (rejecting “involuntariness” 
defense to public drunkenness conviction); Traynor v. Turnage, 485 U.S. 535, 550 (upholding the Veteran 
Administration’s regulation treating alcoholism as “willful misconduct” in certain cases: “…[E]ven among many 
who consider alcoholism a 'disease' to which its victims are genetically predisposed, the consumption of alcohol is 
not regarded as wholly involuntary”). 
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that addiction is a “state of being,” which is much closer to the disease model.55  In other words, 
the Court historically has used mutually exclusive views of addiction in different cases.
A third school, somewhat in the middle between classic behavioralists (who tend to see 
addiction as nothing more than bad habit) and the treatment community are Chicago School 
economists like Gary Becker, who offer a “rational actor” model for addiction.56  Becker 
explains addiction in terms of consumers whose current decisions to consume (he does use a 
model of conscious decision for addiction) are heavily influenced by future values of the good; 
that is, that their cravings will steadily increase.57  Richard Posner argued early on that addicts 
were simply hyperbolic discounters (that is, individuals who place excessive value on immediate 
gratification and inadequate value on future consequences),58 but he has more recently refined 
his model to argue that addicts simply externalize the costs of their consumption onto their future 
self, which in some sense is a different person (separated by time, at least).59
55 Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) (holding that addiction is a “state of being” that cannot be 
criminalized).
56 See generally Becker, supra note ___.   Addiction poses one of the most common and serious challenges 
to the rational-actor model of the law and economics school.  It appears to be the ultimate example of purely 
irrational behavior, of individuals continuing to act in a way they know to be self-destructive, counter-productive, 
and against their other preferences.  The impingement on the most basic assumptions of economic theory made 
addiction an important project for economic theorists, such as Gary Becker and (to a lesser extent) Richard Posner, 
to tackle and explain.
57 See BECKER, ACCOUNTING FOR TASTES, supra note ___, at 50-118.  More recent analysis has found that 
cocaine has a long-run price elasticity of -1.35.  Michael Grossman & Frank J. Chaloupka, The Demand for Cocaine 
by Young Adults: A Rational Addiction Approach, 71 J. HEALTH ECONOMICS 427, 428 (1998).  These results suggest 
that cocaine is in fact quite sensitive to price changes.  “A permanent 10% reduction in price would cause the 
number of cocaine users to grow by approximately 10% in the long-run and would increase the frequency of use 
among users by a little more than 3%.”  Id. at 458.  These results tend to suggest that Becker’s theory of the rational 
addict are in fact supported by price and usage data.
58 See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 267 (ASPEN PUBLISHERS, 5th ed. 1998) 
(“The rational prospective addict knows that he is or will be hooked, so any permanent price reduction (as from 
legalization of drugs) will reduce not only the current cost of consumption but future costs.”); see also id. at 529 
(“An addict, in economic terms, is one whose demand for the addicting product is a positive function of his past 
consumption. Addiction is thus a form of habituation. The rational addict will perceive an increase in the cost of the 
product as in increase in his future rather than merely his present expenses, because consuming the product now will 
make him more likely to buy it in the future.” ). See also A.L. Bretteville-Jensen, Addiction and Discounting, J. 
HEALTH ECONOMICS 18 (1999) 393-407; George-Marios Angeletos et al., The Hyperbolic Consumption Model: 
Calibration, Simulation, and Empirical Evaluation, 15(3) J. ECON. PERSP. 47-68 (2001).
59 See Richard Posner, Rational Choice, Behavioral Economics, and the Law, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1551, 1557 
(1998); also Posner, Are We One Self or Multiple Selves? Implications for Law and Public Policy, 3 LEGAL THEORY
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Despite the analytical appeal of the rational-actor model for addiction, it does not 
comport terribly well with recent discoveries in the brain sciences.  For example, it has recently 
been determined that the language faculties in the brain, rather than the faculties used in 
conceptualizing time, govern self-control and resistance to temptation in general.60 What 
economists call excessive discounting of the future appears to be mostly a failure to reach a 
certain level of abstraction in thought when making a decision.61
Perhaps the most sophisticated model to date, or at least the one that best explains all the 
seemingly contradictory data, is that proposed by Harvard psychology professor Gary Heyman.62
Professor Heyman’s model shows how an addict faces a future of steadily increasing costs for 
continued consumption: escalating social and familial problems, increasingly deteriorated health, 
increased risk of trouble with the law, and diminished ability to earn a living.  At the same time, 
the benefits of ingesting a drug decrease as the addict develops tolerance to the substance.63
Thus, although the addictive substance has a diminishing utility to the addict, the addict’s 
23 (1997). Posner adds that the ability to resist immediate gratification in order to enrich one’s future is the 
difference between a childish approach and that of an adult. See also BERNARD WILLIAMS, Persons, Character, and 
Morality, reprinted in MORAL LUCK 1-19 (CAMBRIDGE 1981). Becker explicitly disavows such a view, based on 
survey studies (and his analytical model) showing that addicts’ present consumption is affected by future 
consequences, at least those related to permanent changes in the price of the addictive substance. BECKER, supra 
note 84, at 11.
60 See, e.g., Adam Gifford, Remembrance of Things Future and Self-Control, unpublished manuscript 
(California State University Department of Economics 2000).
61
 Experiments with monkeys involved a game in which different sized piles of food treats were displayed, 
and each monkey was allowed to pick one.  The monkeys invariably picked the largest pile, but in the game, their 
first choice was always taken away and given to another monkey, leaving the first to select a second, smaller pile.  
Over time, the monkeys were trained to associate various sizes of treats with the written numerals one through nine. 
Then, and only then, could the animals “get” the game, and select a small pile first, knowing they would lose it to a 
companion, in order to have the biggest pile available for the second round. The symbolic or semiotic cognitive 
function (which enables language in humans) was shown to be the deciding force in playing the game right, not the 
monkeys’ ability to conceive of time and duration.   It should be noted that it took nine years to teach monkeys to 
play this game, and only a few minutes for human children to comprehend it.  See id.
62
 Gene M. Heyman, Resolving The Contradictions Of Addiction, BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES 19
(4): 561-610 (1996). Heyman summarizes his key ideas as: “(1) The behaviors that comprise addiction are voluntary 
even though their net consequences are aversive; (2) A voluntary aversive state can exist because the amount of 
behavior devoted to an activity is a function of its relative (rather than absolute) reinforcement rate (the matching 
law); (3) Local rather than overall value functions typically determine drug preference; and  (4) But there are 
occasions in which the overall value functions determine preference, as when the drugs are not immediately 
available and options are under scrutiny.”  Id. at 602-03.
63 Id.
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appetite or preference for the substance continues to grow in relation to alternative activities.  
This disparity between the utility of the drug and the “opportunity costs” of ingesting increases at 
an exponential rate,64 until a maximum point is reached, not of satiation, but of physical and 
temporal capacity to consume all available supplies.  This seems “irrational” in the sense that 
most people use the term, and even “compulsive.”  Compared to other behaviors, it looks more 
like it results from outside coercion unlike typical choices people make when they deliberate 
about what they think is best for them.  Yet the decision is still wholly voluntary, despite being 
made from a skewed menu of alternatives.
Heyman explains that personal choices involve a preliminary decision about whether to 
consider only immediate options or to place the current choice within a framework of clusters of 
choices.65  Then the behavior choice is made between the presently available options.66  Each 
time that a choice is made only between discreet, immediate alternatives, it raises the likelihood 
of subsequent decisions also focusing on immediate options.67 Framing the choice in terms of 
immediate, discreet options is itself one of the preference-oriented “combinations” that can be 
chosen.68
64
 One study found that morphine addicts, given unlimited supply, will increase their intake tenfold over the 
course of a month.  Addicts often consume doses that would have proved lethal to them in their initial period of 
consumption.  Id. at 572.
65
 Heyman subjects his students to a thought problem involving the selection of restaurants, Chinese or 
Italian, on a given evening.  First, the students compare the utility of each option for that particular decision, and 
select the one yielding greater utility, based on given criteria.  Then the problem is rephrased with preference 
considerations for how many nights in a row a person would like to eat at the same type of restaurant, which not 
only changes the equation, but usually changes the result. See id. at 570-73.
66 See also Richard A. Posner, The Ethical Significance of Free Choice: A Reply to Professor West, 99 
HARV. L. REV. 1431, 1445 (May 1986) (“An alcoholic surrenders an important part of his freedom and, it might 
seem, gets little in return.  If the ‘choice’ to become an alcoholic, or more realistically the assumption of the risk of 
alcoholism, is made on incomplete information or involves uncompensated costs to third parties . . . then it is not a 
‘free’ choice in the Pareto-superior sense; and perhaps that is the case with addiction.”).
67
 Heyman, supra note __, at 569-75.  This model uses occurrences rather close to one another temporally, 
within a period of one or two weeks.
68
 Heyman’s article refers to these alternatives as the individual’s “Bookkeeping Scheme.”  While 
economists regularly acknowledge that people choose between combinations of goods, not discreet alternatives, 
their analysis of market behaviors typically works around discreet-choice models.
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Each episode of consumption lowers the future value of almost all alternative or 
competing goods in the person’s life at the same time that it decreases the future value of the 
addictive good itself.  Addictive goods have certain unique traits that tamper with the preference 
scale.  The goods generally provide an intense pleasure or utility that ensues much more rapidly 
(usually within seconds, or at most minutes) than almost all other sources of pleasure or utility in 
life.69  The intoxication process physically delays the enjoyment of other competing sources of 
good until the intoxication is over, and until any residual hangover subsides, which further 
discounts their value.  Unlike most conventional enjoyments, such as eating a favorite food or 
watching an entertaining film, intoxicating substances lack the natural inhibiting function of 
satiation.70  At some point, you have eaten so much that even one more bite of your favorite dish 
would have aversive consequences; one more time through your favorite movie would be 
tedious. Not so with intoxicants, whose consumption undermines the very mechanisms that 
facilitate moderate use. Physical discomfort from withdrawal symptoms strongly encourages 
repeated use.71  A growing body of scientific research indicates that the substances alter the 
physiology of the brain, specifically the areas that mediate reward and conceptualize future 
values of goods.72
69
 These effects are highly reliable and unusually immediate.  Conventional activities that alter one’s mood 
in a desirable way are not as intense, immediate, or reliable as those produced by drugs and alcohol.  Religious 
ecstasy, sexual fulfillment, or a “runner’s high,” for example, all  require more effort, time, and chance of failure.
70 Id. at 573-76.
71
 It should be noted that the DSM-IV does not consider “tolerance” or “withdrawal” features a sine qua 
non for Dependence Disorders; rather, they are “specifiers.” See DSM-IV, supra note __,  at 176-78. Some 
substances produce far greater “tolerance” or “withdrawal” symptoms than others.  The DSM-IV reports that 
cannabis does not seem to produce any “withdrawal” symptoms. Recent studies, however, have disputed the DSM-
IV’s position that cannabis does not lead to withdrawal symptoms.  One recent study found that two-thirds of 
cannabis-dependence patients reported withdrawal.  The same study found that progression from initial 
experimentation with cannabis to regular use was quite rapid, matching the progression of tobacco dependence, and 
surpassing the progression of alcohol dependence.  Thomas J. Crowley et al., Cannabis Dependence, Withdrawal, 
and Reinforcing Effects Among Adolescents with Conduct Symptoms and Substance Use Disorders, DRUG AND 
ALCOHOL DEPENDENCE 50(1998) 27-37.
72 See supra note __ and corresponding text.
The Cocaine Vaccine and “Libertarian Paternalism”
24
The addict, then, is on a track to have exponentially increasing utility in consumption of 
the addictive substance compared to other alternatives, as the value of competing interests 
continuously decrease with each incident of consumption.  The addict is not being “irrational” in 
the sense that economists use the term, despite being on a slippery slope toward self-destruction.  
If anything, the addict is being hyper-rational, choosing between discreet alternatives consistent 
with predictable preferences.  The behavior becomes more and more predictable, more and more 
inevitable, and less and less likely to be reigned in through thoughtful self-control. 
Arguably, Heyman’s model fits better with the scientific evidence that self-control is a 
function of the language faculty of the brain (abstraction of thought) rather than the time/future 
discounting faculties.  The initial decision to treat a choice as a simple selection rather than a 
complex, multifaceted commitment is what starts the spiraling effect of addiction, at least when 
it involves a substance that has certain intoxicating, non-satiating, and tolerance-producing 
effects.   
Heyman’s model also helps explain the clinical reports that post-recovery relapses are not 
associated as much with exposure to token amounts of the substance as much as life events that 
diminish the value of competing goals.73  Admittedly, the conventional wisdom is that a “tiny 
sip” primes the addict to plunge into a binge, and many outside the treatment community assume 
that relapses follow upon stints of “craving.”  The more common cause of relapse, in fact, is an 
event that prompts the recovering addict to adopt an “urgency” framework for choices, as 
“global” goals and objectives cave in to the immediate options.74
73
 Heyman, supra note __, at 568-69.  Another relapse-inducing factor seems to be a revisiting of the 
environment or situation associated with the addictive consumption period.
74
 This phenomenon is not only troubling for the “disease” model proponents, who often maintain that “just 
one drink” is dangerous enough to make relapse inevitable, but also for behavioralists, as there is not a correlation 
between fits of craving and relapse. This behavior is unique to humans.  Laboratory animals usually return to former 
consumption when “primed” with some alcohol or other substance.  Humans, however, can remain resolute in their 
abstinence even when exposed to a dose of the formerly enslaving substance.
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In summary, Heyman’s model of rational addiction seems to resolve the dispute about 
addiction being a “disease,” by explaining both the compulsive nature of the problem and the 
apparent decision-making or volitional activity that occurs.  The data from each competing body 
of literature on addiction is incorporated and reconciled.  The model seems to be an improvement 
upon earlier views of “rational addiction” offered by Becker and others.  Choice-cycle of 
addiction, therefore, is extremely difficult to step out from on one’s own, increasingly so as the 
syndrome progresses.  Disincentive measures, making it more costly to obtain or use the 
addictive substance, can be effective, but only if the cost increase applies exclusively to the 
targeted substance, and not to other goods or enjoyments in the person’s life.  Diminished values 
of goods or combinations competing with the addictive substance will foster addiction instead of 
abating it.75  Conversely, enhancing overall value functions for the individual make the habit 
75 See Neal Kumar Katyal, Deterrence’s Difficulty, 95 MICH. L. REV. 2385, 2434-38 (1997).  Katyal 
explains the origin of the concept:
The classic example, used by Victorian economist Robert Giffen, concerned the Irish potato 
blight.  Before the blight, the typical Irish family ate a diet consisting mostly of cheap potatoes and 
a little bit of meat, which was considerably more expensive than potatoes.  When the blight hit, 
potato prices rose and the real income of the Irish plummeted.  Had potatoes been superior goods, 
one would expect that the consumption of potatoes would have decreased because their price 
increased.  But Giffen observed that potato consumption increased; the Irish ate more potatoes 
than they did before the blight, because the high potato price reduced income to the point where 
meat had become prohibitively expensive.  Because there were no available substitutes for meat 
besides potatoes, the price increase led the Irish to become more dependent on potatoes than they 
were previously.  The positive income effect of the potato price increase had dwarfed the negative 
substitution effect.  There are, therefore, three types of goods: superior goods, where a price 
increase in the good will reduce consumption of the good; inferior goods, where a decrease in 
income will increase consumption of the good; and Giffen goods, where an increase in the price of 
a good will increase consumption of the good.
Id. at 2435-36.  Katyal explains that this could help explain why sometimes illegal drug use seems to increase at the 
same time that sanctions for the drug increase. See also Stevenson, Should Addicts Get Welfare?, supra note ___ at 
219, discussing Giffen goods in the context of using the termination of welfare benefits as a misguided policy tool 
for forcing  drug addicts to rehabilitate; Jensen, Robert T. and Miller, Nolan, "Giffen Behavior: Theory and 
Evidence" (January 2002), KSG Working Paper No. RWP02-014. http://ssrn.com/abstract=310863 (discussing 
empirical data of rice and noodles functioning as Giffen goods in certain regions of China); Kris De Jaegher 
"Understanding Giffen Behavior as an Extreme Case of Asymmetric Substitutability" (November 2003). 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=474860 (demonstrating that “Giffen behavior can be obtained by considering it as an 
extreme case of asymmetric substitutability”).
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more resistible, bringing consumption under the control of overall values rather than “local” or 
immediate functions.76
III. PAROLE
There is a debate about whether parole is a gift or a right.  Not surprisingly, the ones arguing 
that it is a right are usually prisoners (and their advocates).  Courts have sent mixed signals, in a 
sense: the initial granting, denying, or revoking of parole is completely up to the discretion of the 
designated administrative board—supporting the view that it is a gift from the state.  On the 
other hand, prisoners earn “good time” credits (credit for periods of submissive behavior, not 
credits toward a “good time” in the future), with an elaborate system for earning and 
accumulating these credits, and for losing them through deductions for bad behavior.  Courts 
have held that prisoners have a liberty interest in the credits once they have accrued, and 
deduction cannot occur without some due process.  In this sense, then, parole is a right.77
Probation is not a right.78
76
 Behavioral scientists have recently applied a paradigm called “Momentum Theory” to the phenomenon 
of addiction, isolating the strength (“mass”) of the preference from its rate of response (“velocity”). See, e.g., John 
Nevin & Randolf Grace, Behavioral Momentum and the Law of Effect, 23(1) BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES 
1999.  Heyman’s explanation, though, more closely resembles the acceleration of a falling object than simple 
momentum problems, as several factors combine to generate exponential growth in the direction and force of the 
preference.  Acceleration of objects caused by gravitational force is calculated as 9.8(meters)/seconds2. Using this as 
a model for decisions and preference, one could analogize that the strength of the compulsion on the addict in a 
given situation is a factor of the addictiveness of the substance (representing mass), with the time of previous 
indulgence (either the length of the period of the addiction or the number of times the craving has been indulged) 
squared.  The point is that the reinforcing action of the drug magnifies the likelihood of the next episode of 
consumption exponentially. The further an object falls, the harder it is to stop.  This model explains quite well how 
addicts could experience a “loss of control,” observable to those around them (such as family or treatment 
providers), while at the same time manifest all the signs of someone making a series of choices.
77
 There is an interesting question about the expectation at sentencing that the period of incarceration will 
be lower than the actual sentence due to parole—and whether this is taken into account by judges, who might ratchet 
up sentences accordingly, assuming the defendant will actually serve only a fraction of the time sentenced.  
Sometimes, things may not go as planned, and the defendant may not get parole.  In such a case, one could argue 
that the defendant is serving a longer sentence than intended, although this argument is unlikely to prevail when the 
prisoner brings it into court.
In an article discussing the psychology of officials authorized with the governance of criminal justice, 
Donald Dripps postulates that culpability is often attributed mostly to the personal choices of the defendant, and the 
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There is almost no debate, though, that parole and probation can be subjected to certain 
conditions, such as regularly scheduled visits to a parole officer, drug tests, and even restraining 
orders to stay away from one’s victims or certain locations.79  Restrictions on travel may also 
apply.80
surrounding circumstances involved are rarely considered, resulting in “punishment out of proportion to a rational 
measurement of just deserts.”  Donald A. Dripps, Fundamental Retribution Error: Criminal Justice and the Social 
Psychology of Blame, 56 VAND. L. REV. 1383, 1385-89 (2003). 
78
 See Williams v. State, 2003 Tex. App. LEXIS 4529 (Texas App. 2003):  “An award of probation is not a 
right, but a contractual privilege, and conditions of probation are terms of the contract entered into between the trial 
court and the defendant.”
79 See 18 U.S.C. §3583(d) (2003); Edward W. Sieh, A Theoretical Basis For Handling Technical 
Violations, 67 FED. PROBATION 28 (2003):
In 1973 the federal probation system used various generic requirements as conditions of probation, 
including: not breaking the law, associates, work, leaving jurisdiction, changes of address, 
following instructions, and reporting. By 1995 things had changed. Federal statute (Section 5B1.4) 
provides a current list of recommended conditions for probation and supervised release. The court 
can impose a condition that the defendant not commit another federal, state or local crime during 
the term of probation. The court can also impose a condition that the defendant not possess illegal 
controlled substances. The court may impose other conditions that 1) are reasonably related to the 
nature and circumstances of the offense, the history and characteristics of the defendant, and the 
purposes of sentencing and 2) involve only such deprivation of liberty or property as are 
reasonably necessary to effect the purposes of sentencing (USC § 1994 P.P. 5B1.3). If a term of 
probation is imposed for a felony, the court shall impose at least one of the following as a 
condition of probation: a fine, an order of restitution, or community service, unless the court finds 
on the record that extraordinary circumstances exist that would make such a condition plainly 
unreasonable, in which event the court shall impose one or more of the conditions set forth under 
18 U.S.C. §3563(b)(11).  These conditions include not leaving the jurisdiction, reporting, honest 
reporting and following instructions, meeting family obligations, regular work, changes in 
employment or residence, substance abuse, associates, field visits, notification of arrest, working 
as an informer, and notification of inherent risk accompanying record. Further conditions can be 
placed on the offender concerning possession of a firearm, payment of restitution, payment of fine, 
access to financial records, halfway house residency, home detention, community service, 
occupational restrictions, treatment, and electronic monitoring.
See also Griffen v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 874 (1987) (holding that conditions placed upon a supervised 
releasee’s liberty do not constitute unreasonable searches or seizures under the Fourth Amendment);  United States 
v. Wright, 86 F.3d 64 (5th  Cir. 1996) (holding that the requirement of drug testing imposed upon a person during a 
period of supervised release, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §3583(d), is not a violation of the releasee’s Fourth Amendment 
rights).
An interesting comparison can be drawn between the ideas of mandatory vaccinations for parolees and 
certain courts’ attempts to require compulsory contraception as a condition of release.  Since the advent of Norplant 
(a female contraceptive administered via implant under the patient’s skin), some courts have been increasingly 
turning toward this drug as a means to implement release conditions barring conception and as an attempt to prevent 
child abuse.  Janet F. Ginzberg, Compulsory Contraception as a Condition of Probation: The Use and Abuse of 
Norplant, 58 BROOK. L. REV. 979, 979-81 (1992) (arguing that mandatory contraception as a response to child 
abuse is both unconstitutional and irrational and that the use of Norplant creates the potential danger of 
governmental interference into personal rights, especially where other less-invasive alternatives exist).
80 See, e.g., Sieh, supra note __, at 29:
Further elaboration on the conditions of probation is found in the Survey of Adults on Probation 
(SAP), a survey conducted by the Bureau of Justice Statistics on over 4000 probationers. 
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Suppose, then, that parolees had to get a shot immunizing them against cocaine (both its 
euphoric and deleterious effects).81  A high percentage of prisoners either have drug convictions
as part of their reason for being in prison in the first place, or a history of substance abuse.  From 
a practical standpoint, the shots fit reasonably well into the usual schedule of visits to the parole 
or probation officer and regular drug tests.82  The convict could receive the shot at the time of the 
visit, or a certificate from a clinic could suffice as evidence.  For that matter, a urine or blood test 
checking for illicit drugs would also indicate whether the vaccine had been administered.83
The utilitarian arguments84 in favor of this are fairly clear, but not airtight.  Cocaine is one of 
the leading illegal drugs in this country, and is the most significant illegal drug by some 
Probation conditions are an important feature of probation supervision. The SAP data indicate that 
82 percent of probationers are given three or more conditions, which often include monetary 
penalties, drug testing, employment requirements, and mandatory treatment. Monetary 
requirements were the most common condition (84 percent).  We find that 61 percent were 
required to pay supervision fees, 56 percent were to pay [sic] a fine, and 55 percent were to pay 
court cost [sic].  Another 33 percent are required to pay victim restitution.  One in ten probationers 
were restricted from any contact with the victim.  One in four were required to perform 
community service, two of every five were required to maintain employment, to enroll in an 
employment or educational program. Ten percent of the probationers were under some form of 
monitoring or restriction of movement.  Since so many probationers were convicted of public 
order offenses, especially those related to alcohol abuse, it is not surprising that two out of five 
probationers (40 percent) were required to enroll in substance abuse treatment. Alcohol treatment 
is required more frequently for misdemeanants than for felons (41 percent, compared to 21 
percent), while drug treatment is required more often for felons (28 percent compared to 15 
percent).  Nearly a third of all probationers were subject to mandatory drug testing
81
 Of course, it would not be a single shot, at least given the current state of technology.  In order to be 
effective, the shot would need to be repeated every three months or so, or four times per year.  For those who find 
offensive (or intrusive) the idea of a mandatory shot for those on supervised release, in a given year the cocaine 
vaccine would present these issues of intrusiveness – arguably a form of paternalism – four times.
82 See supra note ___ and text, indicating that booster shots of the anti-cocaine vaccine are required to 
establish the required basal level of the blood serum required to effectively reduce the effects of ingestion of 
cocaine.
83
 The problem with urine tests for those on supervised release is that they are susceptible to fraud in 
varying degrees.  Given that the check-in appointments are often scheduled in advance and predictable, the 
individual can obtain a “clean” urine sample from a friend (or vendor) and by some subterfuge substitute it for her 
own.  If the testing was for the cocaine vaccine, however, the individual would need a urine sample clean of drugs 
but tainted with indicators of TA-CD’s presence in the body.  
84
 The utilitarian approach generally accepts punishment as a means to an ends; i.e. punishment is an evil 
that can be tolerated only in the case where the future positive outcomes outweigh the bad.  See, e.g., Dripps, supra
note __, at 1423; JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION (1789).
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measures.85  Parole and probation are attempts to give the prisoner a chance to start over and re-
integrate into the community; illicit drug use can be grounds for revoking parole or violating 
probation.  The individuals seem to be a high-risk group for drug abuse, given the circumstances.  
There are also reasons for seeing drug use by this group as particularly serious, as it jeopardizes 
their reintegration into the community and makes it more likely that they will become entangled 
again in crime, especially drug-related crime.86
Some parolees (or probationers), however, may not want the vaccine.  Perhaps they would 
object to it because they find it intrusive, or they have a fear of needles, or they have a contrary 
disposition.  Perhaps they do not want to be immunized against cocaine because they had 
planned to enjoy it as part of their limited return to freedom.  Whatever the reason, there would 
inevitably be a group, however small or large, of convicts who are otherwise eligible for parole,
and who desire parole, but who find the cocaine vaccine objectionable.
85 See Anne S. Kimbel, Note, Pregnant Drug Abusers Are Treated Like Criminals Or Not Treated At All: A 
Third Option Proposed 19 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 521, 531 n. 74 (2003) (discussing 1992 Department of 
Justice report indicating that cocaine was the most common drug found in arrestees, which presents a difficult 
question – should the “most problematic drug” award go to the drug sold and consumed the most often, the drug that 
has the greatest gross volume by weight in circulation, the drug with the largest market share of the black market, or 
the drug most often associated with crimes and criminals?).  See also Mary O'Flynn, Comment, The Adoption And 
Safe Families Act Of 1997: Changing Child Welfare Policy Without Addressing Parental Substance Abuse,  16 J. 
CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 243, 247 N.8  (1999) (discussing GAO report indicating that cocaine was the most 
common drug to which young foster children have exposure); Hon. William D. Hunter, Drug Treatment Courts: An 
Innovative Approach To The Drug Problem In Louisiana 44 LA. B.J. 418 (1997) (identifying cocaine as the “drug of 
choice” in Lousiana).  But see Federal Sent. Rep. Vol. 12, Number 6, May/June 2000 Symposium, Views from the 
Sentencing Commission, Statement of Vice-Chair John R. Steer on Drug Sentencing Policy and Trends before the 
House Governmental Reform Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy and Human Resources at *7:
In 1992, crack cocaine was the predominant trafficked drug in only three states.  However, [sic] by 
1996, crack cocaine was the predominant drug type in 17 states (most of which are in the midwest 
and southeast).  According to the most recent data, crack cocaine still is the predominant drug type 
in 10 states (again largely in the midwest and southeast).  Since 1996, however, the number of 
marijuana cases has increased dramatically to become the most prevalent drug type for the last 
three years.
86
 These concerns are particularly relevant for those convicted of drug-related offenses and then put on 
supervised release; but the concerns about drugs addiction (or a new arrest on a drug charge) frustrating the goals of 
supervised release for non-drug crimes would be pertinent. 
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Apply libertarian paternalism.  This might be a classic case of bounded rationality on the part 
of the convicts.87  Assume for the moment that the convicts’ objections are not ideological 
(genuine religious conviction, etc.), but based instead on rumor or misinformation that the 
vaccine has horrific side effects.  Another rumor, already in circulation in some quarters, is that a 
weaker dose of the vaccine might only partially immunize the subject, meaning that it takes a 
higher quantity of the drug to get high, which in turn inconveniences the consumer who will 
have to buy more.88  The probationer or parolee may also have an irrational fear of needles, or an 
unreasonable contrariness symptomatic of Borderline Personality Disorder.89  All of these seem 
pretty irrational—from our standpoint, the criminal is better off getting the vaccine on two 
counts.  First, the convict would fare better in society without drug abuse or addiction as an 
impediment.  Second, the individual would be better off going free on supervised release, and 
staying free, than being in prison because of an irrational impulse not to be vaccinated.
This might be, therefore, a good case for libertarian paternalism to step in.  Sunstein and 
Thaler would point out, of course, that paternalism is already afoot to the extent that the vaccine 
is required; the defendant must choose between accepting an unwanted vaccine and staying 
incarcerated.  The vaccine could be merely optional for prisoners, but that could mean it would 
go largely unused.  There is some paternalistic justification for requiring it; the defendant would 
be better off cocaine-free, especially given the obstacles that probationers and parolees already 
87
 A traditional economic approach would assume instead that the parolee’s personal utilities are merely 
different from what we think they should be, or what seems to us to be in their long-term best-interest; but that does 
not make it irrational per se, just a function of different priorities (reintegration into the community being lower than 
other things, for example).  Without concerns about the parolees being victims of their own bounded rationality, of 
course, the libertarian-paternalist tension dissipates, becoming instead a matter of individual self-interest versus 
societal welfare.  
88 See Kosten et al., supra note ___, at 1197 (“However, a therapeutic vaccine based on active-
immunization has the potential to provide long lasting clinical efficacy for relapse prevention after 
administration….”). 
89 See Goldstein, supra note __, at __.
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face in reintegration.90  There are also utilitarian reasons strong enough to stand even without the 
paternalistic concerns: deterrence (or prevention) of future crime, reduction of recidivism rates 
(which involve not only the cost of the new crime but also the social cost of reincarcerating the 
criminal), and helping guarantee the success of rehabilitating the criminal into a productive 
member of society.91
I mentioned above that the utilitarian arguments were not airtight.  Here is one reason: the 
parolees and probationers are already subject to regular drug tests in many cases, so they know 
they cannot use cocaine without getting caught and jeopardizing their supervised release.92  The 
cocaine vaccine is arguably redundant in this case.  Of course, from a paternalistic perspective, 
the vaccine saves the individual from sabotaging her limited freedom through simple weakness 
of the will.93  In this sense it is like requiring airbags in automobiles simply because people will 
not wear their (also required) seatbelts.
90
 Paternalism does seem to be an important issue for probationers and is in constant tension with 
libertarian ideals. Sieh reports that many probation officers are loathe to bring their assigned probationers to court 
for minor violations.  See Sieh, supra note __, at 28:
Many probation officers are hesitant to bring a probationer to court for a violation. First, a new 
charge may be unfounded and dismissed by the court, which would mean a waste of time. Second, 
the officer may seek time to develop an alternative treatment plan. This is important if the officer 
wishes to maintain the relationship with the probationer and is concerned that a hearing will 
reverse the process. Third, the officer may feel somewhat responsible for the client's failure. This 
opinion certainly can develop out of recognition of the lack of time available for each case with 
rising caseloads and greater numbers of pre-sentence reports. Interviews conducted by the author 
with over 50 probation officers reveal that not all officers are likely to be concerned with violating 
the probationer and that something else might be happening.
This highlights a complicating feature of probation and parole, at least regarding issues of paternalism: the 
probation officers who deal directly with the subject may be motivated by different concerns than other 
policy makers, such as courts and legislatures; while the latter two groups can create far-reaching rules, the 
individual officer has tremendous discretion about reporting, monitoring, etc.
91 See supra note ___ and accompanying text on utilitarian views of punishment and social consequences. 
Of course, this is not a good case for discussing opt-in or opt-out measures, like Sunstein and Thaler (and the other 
authors in this field) discuss, as with 401(k) plans and other deferred-tax benefits (like parking near the law school).  
This is a case where any type of option will yield the same result—avoidance.  Similarly, there is not much of a 
“framing” issue here, as the vaccine is an either-or choice, as opposed to selection from a menu of options, as might 
be the case with insurance carriers.
92 See supra note ___ and accompanying text.
93
 For example, Sieh reports that drug violations are frequent, and that probation officers tend to let minor 
violations accumulate or build up before reporting the violations to court –at which point the consequences for the 
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Airbags may be necessary, however, if the seatbelts really are not in use.  Returning to 
supervised release, it may be that some are beating the system, either by cheating on the drug 
tests (using someone else’s urine, for example) or by simply disappearing and eluding detection 
indefinitely.94  In these cases, the scales are weighted more with social utilitarianism than with 
paternalistic concerns.  In general, the utilitarian concerns in this case are mostly focused not on 
the harm to the convict, but to third parties (victims of future crimes) and societal costs (of law 
enforcement and punishment). 
So far, then, we have paternalistic concerns for the parolee’s success and utilitarian concerns 
about the cost of possible recidivism.  Now let us introduce a third motivator, retribution.  The 
subject group consists, for the most part, of criminals.  They have made decisions in the past that 
probationer may be rather severe.  He quotes one officer as follows (illustrating how court delays and discretion of 
the officers interact to create an interesting dynamic):
If they are not reporting they are not going to counseling; if they are not going to the clinic, they 
are not following up any other conditions of probation. Sometimes a violation is the only way to 
get their attention.  He has a couple missed reports, he has a few positive urine tests for cocaine, 
marijuana, and you go into court for a violation on all of these things. That process will take you a 
month and a half. By the time that you get an arraignment, lawyer is assigned, you come back, 
conduct a hearing, adjournments, usually he is out because they set bail. Now in that month and 
half process, if you chose to refer him back to the clinic, you start working with a pre-existing 
relationship with the clinic, you know some of the counselors and you ask what do you think of 
this guy's chances? If I get some positive feedback from the counselor, even if I am in a violation 
process on the guy, I will send him back there. If during that violation he does pretty well, you 
have got some options open to you.
Sieh, supra note __, at 29.
94 See generally id. at 28-30, reporting that violations are very frequent and often go unreported.  Despite 
the underreporting, the failure rate for probation has increased:
The rates of recidivism of probationers were historically low due to the selection of persons who 
were likely to succeed on probation. Today, however, we find felons on probation who have much 
higher rates of recidivism. Based on federal data alone, there were 20,956 probation terminations: 
81 percent had no violations, 10 percent experienced technical violations, 3.5 percent were 
charged with new crimes, and 5 percent had administrative case closures. At the federal level, we 
are dealing with 2,900 technical violations during any one year. Some officers violate as many as 
25 probationers per year, some of whom are absconders.
Id. at 29.  It is unclear whether underreporting exacerbates this problem (by not nipping in the bud a pattern of 
increasing violations), or if the statistics would be even more alarming if reporting was more consistent.
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were not only bad for them, but that violated the law, probably violated social norms, and often 
risked (for no good reason) harm to others.  There is a resulting mistrust.95
This mistrust is based on the individual track record of each defendant, not the traditional 
economic presumption that people naturally tend to act in their own immediate self-interest 
rather than the collective greater good.  This non-economic form of mistrust is partly Bayesian: 
these individuals appear untrustworthy because they have already demonstrated that they make 
some very bad decisions.  This raises the likelihood, or the perceived likelihood, that they will do 
so again.  The cocaine vaccine provides a way to head off some future bad decisions.
The past decisions96 were “bad,” however, in more than one sense.   First, they were bad 
from the standpoint of the defendant’s long-term self-interest (paternalistic concern); second, 
they were bad according to the harm principle (ignoring for the moment the fierce debate about 
drug laws in this regard).   In addition, there is a moral component here, the moral judgment that 
some commentators believe is the essential difference between Criminal Law and Torts.97  There 
is a stigma in being a convict.  There is something more condemnatory about saying a defendant 
is “guilty” than saying the defendant was “negligent” or even “liable.”   Their decisions were 
“bad” in the sense of being “blameworthy,” which is different from a utilitarian concern.98
95 See Dripps, supra note__, at __ (discussing this distrust as it relates to the fundamental retribution error 
and criminal justice).
96
 This is referring to the decisions that originally landed them in jail.
97 See, e.g., JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW __ (2nd ed. 2003). The point here is not 
whether morality should be an aspect of criminal law—such a question is outside the scope of this article—but 
rather to recognize that it often is already, as seen by the social stigma that usually attaches along with a conviction.  
98
 Of course, some commentators argue that the utilitarian value of criminal sanctions operated through 
shame or stigma, rather than a direct fear of incarceration or fines.  See generally  Dan M. Kahan, What Do 
Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 591, 630-53 (1996) (arguing that shame-based sanctions can 
influence public norms that condemn criminality); Note, Shame, Stigma, And Crime: Evaluating The Efficacy Of 
Shaming Sanctions In Criminal Law, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2186 (2003).  My discussion of the utilitarian issues here 
deals not with the costs and benefits of punishment itself but rather with attaching inoculation with the cocaine 
vaccine as a condition of supervised release or parole.  Shame and stigma in this setting are important because they 
influence the attitudes of policymakers about how much autonomy (in matters such as inoculation against cocaine) 
parolees and probationers deserve.  This, in turn, brings up a larger issue that Sunstein and Thaler did not address, 
namely, that paternalistic moves by policy makers are not always driven by condescension toward the capacity of 
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Mistrust of parolees, then, has an ambiguity between a simple Bayesian mistrust and moral 
mistrust.  Beyesian mistrust says past patterns predict present probabilities (going into the future 
as well).  Moral mistrust says that a decision of which we disapprove deprives one of entitlement 
to normal levels of trust or benefit of the doubt.99  Sunstein and Thaler talk about the bounded 
rationality of certain subjects, indicating a type of mistrust regarding the subject group’s capacity 
to make the objectively optimal decision.100  This is different from moral mistrust, or even from 
moral failure as another category of the subject group’s bounded rationality.  The benevolent 
paternalists, though, are also subject to bounded rationality, and moral judgments may be one 
form of this that the model fails to take into account.101
There are several unanswered questions here.  First, there is the question of whether bad 
moral judgment by the subject group qualifies as a type of “bounded rationality” that merits 
some paternalistic intervention.  Second, there is a question of whether moral sentiments—or 
better, judgmental feelings, although not necessarily in the pejorative sense—constitute a type of 
“bounded rationality” for the group in charge.  Third, there is a question of whether libertarian 
the subject group to make good decisions, but also whether the subject group “deserves” to make their own 
decisions.
99
 We may withhold trust in such cases as a way of punishing the person (tit-for-tat), or perhaps we believe 
that one moral failing, however incidental and singular, represents a deeper character flaw, and we know that it is 
usually difficult to extirpate bad character traits.  This latter version may be a type or Bayesian morality: once you 
have done certain bad things, there is a higher likelihood of more to come.
100 See generally Sunstein & Thaler, supra note ___ at 1167-69.
101
 The moral aspect of judgments about probationers can work in different ways depending on the level of 
the decisionmaker.  Sieh recounts one probation officer who related that reporting violations was a frustrating 
obstacle course through the conflicting value judgments of the other state agents in the process:
Violations are the most frustrating part of this job. It is extremely time consuming. When he 
violates probation he is violating the judge's order and yet the judge says we have a probation 
officer who is accusing you of having violated your probation. He gets a lawyer and we go to trial. 
The DA prosecutes and I am the witness for the prosecution. The judge is trying to decide if I am 
telling the truth or the probationer is telling the truth. So a lot of times arrangements have been 
made beforehand. Then it is a question of what will we do. Fifty percent of the time or more the 
defense attorney talks the judge into continuing him on probation. The defense attorney's thinking 
is just the opposite of mine. His thinking is, that if the judge didn't lock this guy up for his original 
crime, why would you even consider locking him up for something as insignificant as not 
reporting to a probation officer. They make me look like a schmuck.
Sieh, supra note __, at 29.
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paternalism should contain some sort of rule to limit intervention by those in charge in cases 
where judgmental moral attitudes are likely to influence policy.
The libertarian paternalism model does not presently have guidelines for situations where the 
policy makers themselves are subject to bounded rationality.  This will come up again in the 
context of welfare recipients, but in a different form that is less condemning of the subject group. 
More generally, some scenarios have telltale signs for generating bad decisions by the policy 
makers, rather than by the subject group.  An example would be cases where the decisionmakers 
are tempted to act out of self-preservation, particularly when the stakes are high.  These 
situations can generate policies that others later regret:  cover-ups are a good example.  Cover-
ups of sexual misconduct by priests, of financial skullduggery at Enron, or of the toxicity of the 
airborne dust at the asbestos plant, all illustrate paternalism that cloaked itself (temporarily, at 
least) in benevolence but was tainted by the director’s self-preservation instinct.  Sunstein and 
Thaler’s model would benefit from some guidelines to prevent such abuses, such as special rules 
limiting paternalism more in these cases.
Morals present a more challenging problem than self-preservation. Who decides that the 
policy makers’ morals are right or wrong?  There seems to be little accountability here,102 but 
102
 The fact that there is little accountability for individual decision makers’ morals is a general problem for 
the libertarian paternalist model; and it takes on special significance in the realm of probation, where individual 
officers have enormous discretion in monitoring and enforcing court-ordered conditions of parole.  See, e.g., id. at 
31:
Public service workers who interact with citizens in the course of their jobs and who have 
substantial discretion in the execution of their work are called street-level bureaucrats.  The 
concept of regulatory uncertainty implies a forced tolerance for individual conduct. This tolerance 
is exhibited in the choice of harmful activity subject to control. For example, a probation officer is 
not able to completely restrict all of the possible illegal activities available to a probationer. 
Second, regulatory agencies are charged with a particular policing mission. However, there is still 
the question as to the objective: Should the mission be eradication or the repression of the 
problem? If the behavior is not considered serious, is it to be repressed and handled with a 
measure of discretion? How much attention each violation receives depends on the resources 
available. It would seem that officers use their discretion not so much to deter the offender but to 
regulate the offender's behavior, done in full recognition that rehabilitation may not be needed or 
always possible and that acceptable levels of incapacitation can only be achieved within certain 
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disallowing any moral judgments is the same as saying it is wrongful to apply those judgments to 
policy—which in itself is a moral judgment, of course.  It is not clear that those in charge should 
withdraw or refrain from meddling simply because the situation touches on morality.  At the 
same time, libertarian paternalism does not have a good answer for cases where the mistrust of 
the subject group might be based less on utilitarian concerns than on moral judgments about 
what the subject group did in the past, or how much autonomy they deserve.
Figure 1 helps illustrate my point.103  Those making decisions about whether to require 
individuals on supervised release to be vaccinated against cocaine can have three types of 
motives besides a simply, objective analysis of the parolee’s best interests.
Fig. 1.
moral mistrust
(includes retribution, etc.)
paternalistic mistrust social utilitarian mistrust
(subject may not act in her own best interest) (subject may harm others or 
externalize costs generally)
limits. Rules, however, may be impediments to effective supervision, in that individualized justice 
would indicate a different course of action than the one called for by policy.
Of course, if a court ordered the cocaine vaccine, it could be a tool for limiting this delegation of authority to the 
probation officer.  On the other hand, it is possible that the probation officer himself could order the vaccine even 
where a court did not do so, especially in jurisdictions that allow the most discretion for these officers.
103
 For a terse discussion of similar issues, especially in light of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 
1984, see id. at 30 (“[P]robation is considerably different from the [previous] dichotomous enforcement-social 
welfare model . . . [The Guidelines] now set the tone and the probation officer-as-caseworker role is no longer 
predominant. At the state level, the recent language of the performance-based measures emphasizes risk assessment, 
resource allocation, and internal assessment.”).
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Sunstein and Thaler, as well as the authors of the “asymmetric paternalism” article, focus 
entirely on paternalistic mistrust.  Societal utilitarian mistrust is not truly paternalistic, although 
an extreme form of libertarianism might say so.  It is present, however, as a consideration that 
must be balanced with the paternalistic concerns; the thesis of asymmetric paternalism is that 
intervention is appropriate when the scales between the two bottom considerations tip (even 
slightly) to the left.104  Vaccine and immunization questions will often present both of these 
considerations, even when substance abuse is not an issue.  When it comes to those on 
supervised release, however, I have argued that the paternalist mistrust is somewhat weak, as are
the utilitarian concerns (especially given the redundancy issue).  The moral mistrust is quite 
strong in this case and would tend to dominate over the other two; hence it is stationed on top.  
This is not to say that the three values in Figure 1 are in tension; they may be three different 
reasons for doing the same thing.  It is problematic to apply the libertarian paternalism model 
where moral mistrust dominates.
The moral mistrust issue could make the cocaine vaccine a popular condition of supervised 
release.  The fact that it would be a stipulation of a benefit that many see as undeserved, rather 
than simply forced on all inmates, removes the coercive element enough for the moral mistrust to 
cloud the paternalist judgment.105
104 See Camerer et al., supra note __, at __.
105
 It could also be appealing to decision makers at the other end of the moral continuum, that is, those 
motivated mostly by pity or paternalism toward the probationer.  See Sieh, supra note __, at 29:
With the recent history of getting tough on offenders, one would expect violators to be given jail 
time when they fail to comply with the conditions of probation. This is not true. It seems clear that 
probationers are given new conditions when they have problems during supervision. If the 
offender is convicted of a new offense, we find that offenders are likely to be given a new 
condition (37 percent) more frequently than incarcerated (28 percent). Those arrested for a new 
offense are more likely to receive new conditions over jail time, too. Of offenders who abscond, 
25 percent received jail time, but slightly more (28 percent) were given new conditions. We see a 
reluctance to put offenders in jail for their noncompliance. To some degree we see a sizeable 
proportion of offenders who experience no new conditions in response to their technical 
violations. This pattern continues with positive drug test, failure to appear, failure to pay fines, 
failure to attend and complete program, and other technical violations. This data indicates that the 
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This raises a final issue regarding parolees and probationers, at least for the Sunstein-Thaler 
model: where the subject group are recipients of some benefit that policy makers view as an act 
of pure grace, an undeserved gift—like supervised release—those in charge are likely to feel 
more latitude with paternalistic interventions.  This is an important point for revising the model.  
The model does a good job of avoiding elitist attitudes that focus on the relative decision-making 
abilities of the subject group, and focuses instead on particular situations where decisions go 
wrong.  There are still aspects of the subject group’s status—apart from decision-making 
ability—that will affect how quickly the ruling group moves toward intervention or limitations 
on choice.  Where the subject group appears to be on the receiving end of an undeserved 
gratuity, those in charge will feel free to make some other unrelated decisions for the subject 
group that are attached as conditions of the gratuity.106  These unanswered questions about the 
moral failings of subject group members triggering libertarian paternalism, and the moral 
judgments of the control group influencing their decisions, would arise in a variety of contexts 
unrelated to criminal law or drugs; the cocaine vaccine and supervised release simply serve to 
highlight the point.107
courts are approaching violations not as a means to discipline the offender but as a means to gain 
the offender's compliance with the law.
The cocaine vaccine would fit well with this agenda, by providing a means of “ensuring” rehabilitation of 
good behavior without re-incarcerating the defendant, which many seem to want to avoid.
106
 Apart from the parolee-probationer setting, managers or owners of firms could feel this way about 
bonuses, keeping positions after a merger, etc.
107
 A related issue for supervised release, albeit outside the scope of this article, is the increasingly 
unfettered discretion delegated to probation officers, who not only decide whether to report technical violations, but 
often modify court-ordered conditions of probation on their own, informally:
The American Probation and Parole Association believes officer authority to impose conditions of 
supervision is valid and deserves support, to promote consistency in the response to violations. In 
a recent survey (APPA, 2001) of APPA members, fewer than half (46 percent) of the respondents 
indicated that field officers have the authority to modify conditions of supervision. However, a 
substantial number (69 percent) felt that officers modified conditions informally. It is apparent in 
some jurisdictions that line officers feel justified in altering some aspects of an offender's 
supervision strategy, regardless of whether this is a matter of policy. Two states, Oregon and 
South Carolina, have programs that provide specific guidelines for the officer to increase imposed 
sanctions.
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Besides the problem of the moral mistrust levied at parolees or probationers, some policy 
makers (or the voting public) could also view supervised release as a type of public “benefit,” 
akin to welfare.  Welfare benefits, whether in the form of cash assistance or special opportunities 
like supervised release, come with an increasing number of conditions and expectations.  The 
cocaine vaccine could be an addition to this list.
IV. WELFARE RECIPIENTS
Welfare and related programs for the poor are an important part of public policy and a 
significant part of the work of certain administrative agencies.108  These programs, especially 
when they involve direct cash assistance, regularly come with numerous conditions attached. 
There are elaborate conditions for eligibility109 and enrollment,110 and there are extraneous 
Sieh, supra note __, at 30.  If courts develop a concern about officers being too lax and too difficult to control, the 
cocaine vaccine could be viewed as a remedy for ensuring greater compliance with the court’s intended conditions.
108 See, e.g., Statement of Hal Daub, Chairman, Social Security Advisory Board, Reforming the Disability 
Insurance and Supplemental Security Income Disability Programs, Presented to U.S. House Ways and Means 
Committee, Subcommittee on Social Security, June 11, 2002, at: www.ssab.gov/NEW/Testimony/DaubJune11.pdf ; 
Social Security Advisory Board, How SSA’s Disability Programs Can Be Improved, 1-10 (August 1998), available 
at: www.ssab.gov/NEW/Publications/Disability/reports6.pdf (presenting statistics about the unanticipated growth of 
SSI within the Social Security system).  Some commentators have suggested that the mushrooming growth of 
assistance programs for the poor is not only a function of the “free money” idea, but also the fact that enrollees are 
often immediately eligible for Medicaid.  In other words, the need for affordable health insurance among the poor 
may drive the growth of cash assistance programs as much or more than the lure of “easy” money.  See, e.g., Aaron 
Yelowitz, Why Did the SSI-Disabled Program Grow So Much? Disentangling the Effect of Medicaid, 17 J. HEALTH 
ECON. 321, 322-49 (1998) (demonstrating that programs triggering eligibility for Medicaid grew faster during the 
1990’s that other federal welfare programs, such as AFDC, apparently due to this connection); see also Stevenson, 
supra note __, at 190. 
109
 For a very recent and insightful treatment of this subject, see David A. Super, Offering an Invisible 
Hand: The Rise of the Personal Choice Model for Rationing Public Benefits, 113 YALE L .J. 815 (2004) (focusing 
on the shift in program policy toward the choices and incentives of the recipients, rather than neediness, equality, 
etc.).  traditional conditions have included being below a certain income level, being too disabled for work, etc.  
Following the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) of 1996, 
claimants have more selection in the benefits they receive, with different benefits or programs carrying different 
conditions.  One can logically see how economic incentives could serve to facilitate widespread use of the cocaine 
vaccine among welfare recipients.  Those who are drug free would have a particularly advantageous position, and 
may gladly take the vaccine to ensure increased welfare benefits, especially monetary benefits.  Administration of 
the vaccine could help the public feel assured that these specific welfare recipients would not be squander scarce 
public resources on cocaine.
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conditions for continued receipt of the program benefits.111  These include frequent 
recertification of financial or medical eligibility, attending job training seminars, applying for 
employment opportunities, retaining custody of one’s children, avoiding felony convictions, 
avoiding pregnancy,112 and avoiding substance abuse and addiction.113  Enrollment in substance 
abuse rehabilitation programs has also been a condition of receiving certain benefits, particularly 
in the federal system.114
From time to time, there are highly-publicized examples, or at least accusations, of abuse 
of the benefits, and one of the strongest accusations is that welfare recipients are squandering 
their benefits on drugs.115  For this reason, it seems reasonable that policymakers will consider 
making the vaccine a condition of receiving welfare benefits.116  Here, the mistrust is more the 
type associated with classical economic modeling: policymakers might worry that welfare 
recipients will waste scarce public resources (using the benefits to subsidize the initial cost of 
110
 Programs often require documentation of income, monthly expenses (rent receipts and utility bills), and 
medical records.
111 See, e.g., Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970) (upholding limits on dollar amounts of AFDC 
grants per family); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (upholding statute denying welfare benefits to state 
residents of less than a year).
112
 Some states include in their Temporary Family Assistance regulations a deduction in the benefits paid 
for children conceived while enrolled in the program.
113
 The Contract With America Advancement Act of 1996 eliminated SSDI/SSI and Medicare/Medicaid 
coverage for those whose drug or alcohol addiction is a “contributing factor material to their disability.”  P.L. 104-
121, March 29, 1996.  Detailed provisions were included for the phase-out of those already receiving benefits, 
pursuant to normal due process hearing requirements, and the implementation of strict rules for new applicants, 
which are not terribly relevant to the discussion here.  See also Stevenson, supra note __, at 191-94; Anti-Drug 
Abuse Act of 1988, §  5101, 42 U.S.C. §  1437(d)(1)(5) (1990).
114
 Reacting against the growing numbers of addicts receiving benefits, in 1993 Congress included special 
provisions addressing DA&A in the Social Security Independence and Program Improvements Act of 1994.  See 
P.L. 103-296.  Section 201 of P.L. 103-296 placed a three-year time limit on SSI/SSDI benefits to recipients whose 
cases were flagged as DA&A.  SSDI recipients were now included in the treatment, monitoring, and representative-
payee requirements previously applicable to only SSI recipients, and failure to comply with treatment resulted in 
suspension of benefits.  
115
 Christopher M. Wright, SSI: The Black Hole of the Welfare State, Cato Institute Policy Analysis No. 224 
at 5 (April 27, 1995) available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-224es.html; see generally Note, Dethroning the 
Welfare Queen: The Rhetoric of Reform, 107 HARV. L. REV. 2013 (1994).
116
 Mandatory drug testing for welfare recipients, has not always survived constitutional challenges.  See, 
e.g., Marchwinski v. Howard , 113 F. Supp.2d 1134 (E.D. Mich. 2000). See also Michael D. Socha, An Analysis Of 
Michigan's Plan For Suspicionless Drug Testing of Welfare Recipients Under the Fourth Amendment "Special 
Needs" Exception, 47 WAYNE L. REV. 1099 (2001) (“the suspicionless drug testing of welfare recipients and 
applicants does not amount to a ‘special need’ exception to the Fourth Amendment”).
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addiction, the cost of the cocaine itself).  In addition, policymakers could fear that recipients 
would lack normal incentives to show self-restraint to avoid cocaine addiction, because society 
subsidizes their unproductiveness (which is one of the other main short-term personal costs of 
addiction) via welfare payments.117
Of course, from a paternalistic view one could argue that the vaccine is in the best 
interest of the individuals, assuming it cannot hurt them and can help some of them.  The 
paternalistic concerns here, however, will be mixed with other attitudes, such as the belief that 
welfare recipients should be subjected to more limitations on their personal autonomy because of 
mistrust—in this case, the rational-actor mistrust associated with moral hazard and adverse 
selection.  Sunstein and Thaler do not discuss this problem very much—what those in charge 
should do when a policy appears blatantly paternalistic, but is also justifiable due to fears 
(however valid) about moral hazard and adverse selection in the program.  In addition, as with 
parolees and probationers, there is potential for yet another form of “bounded rationality” within 
the leaders themselves, namely, reciprocity instincts about welfare and sharing.  This section will 
first discuss the moral hazard issue and then consider the reciprocity problem.
117
 For a thorough discussion of possible constitutional challenges to mandatory drug testing for welfare 
recipients, see Corinne A. Carey, Crafting A Challenge to the Practice of Drug Testing Welfare Recipients:
Federal Welfare Reform and State Response as the Most Recent Chapter in the War On Drugs, 46 BUFF. L. REV. 
281 (1998) (arguing that random drug testing of recipients violates the Fourth Amendment's rule against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, as well as the due process and equal protection provisions of the Fourteenth 
Amendment).  While Carey is probably not alone in suggesting that drug testing welfare recipients is 
unconstitutional, the Supreme Court has not clearly settled the question.  Presumably, many of the commentators 
who find drug testing for welfare recipients unconstitutional would hold a similar position on a mandatory cocaine 
vaccine for welfare recipients, for essentially the same arguments (with the additional argument of the right to 
bodily integrity).  Those favoring mandatory drug testing for this group, however, seem likely to apply many of the 
same justifications to having the cocaine vaccine as a condition for cash benefits.  See also Philippa M. Guthrie, 
Drug Testing And Welfare: Taking The Drug War To Unconstitutional Limits? 66 IND. L.J. 579 (1991) (concluding 
that conditioning subsistence benefits on drug testing would be ineffective and unconstitutional).
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A perennial concern with public assistance (welfare) is moral hazard:118  The benefits 
might create a perverse incentive to be careless about substance abuse, thus increasing the risk of 
destructive addictions.  The idea is that there is a decreased incentive for recipients to rehabilitate 
or refrain from substance abuse, as the system artificially props them up.119  Of course, the moral 
hazard concerns about welfare relate not only to substance abuse, but to disincentives to work in 
general.120 Applied to the cocaine vaccine as a condition of welfare, the moral hazard concern is 
primarily utilitarian; it focuses on the potential for public resources going to waste.  Such 
concerns fit awkwardly into the context of programs that are largely paternalistic.  Assistance to 
the underprivileged is inherently paternalistic, albeit in the most benevolent sense of the word. 
Adverse selection refers to the unfortunate fact that the people most likely to incur losses 
often want insurance the most, while the safest individuals need it less and begrudge the fact that 
they must subsidize other people’s carelessness. 121  When the people who need insurance the 
least opt out, it skews the risk-averaging and law of big numbers, which is the real advantage of 
118
 For a more detailed discussion of the moral hazard concept and the fallacies of applying it to welfare 
recipients who are addicts, see generally Stevenson, supra note ___ . 
119
 There are also policy concerns that the benefits indirectly pump funds into the illegal drug industry.  For 
example, the Cato Institute’s influential Policy Analysis Paper No. 224, “SSI: The Black Hole of the Welfare State”
asserted: “SSI pumps money directly into the drug economy.” See Wright, supra note __, at 12 (“The need for a 
government-administered disability insurance program has never been established and is particularly questionable 
given that a market for private disability insurance already exists.”).  The moral hazard problem was the underlying 
theme of the political bromides leading up to the changes in the rules for SSI/SSDI in 1994 and 1996.  The 
legislative history is replete with anecdotes of purported abuses of the system, including “junkies” who designate 
their suppliers as their “representative payees,” and alcoholics who designated their local watering hole as the 
mailing address for their benefits checks. See id. at 10-13.
120 See Lars Soderstrom, Moral Hazard in the Welfare State, in Herbert Giersch, ed., REFORMING THE 
WELFARE STATE 25-46 (Springer 1997); see also Gilens, supra note 115 at 185, noting that survey respondents were 
actually less insistent on work requirements for welfare recipients for “single parents with drug or alcohol 
problems.” Tom Baker summarizes the usual rhetoric in this regard: “Because all insurance affects incentives to 
reduce loss, welfare will increase poverty . . .” Baker, supra note 79, at 239.  Note that when insurance was first 
widely marketed in the nineteenth century, many criticized it as a form of gambling, an encouragement to crime, and 
an interference with Divine Providence. Id. at 255-260.
121 See Priest, supra note 126, at 1548 (“Where insureds, ex post, can affect the level of claimed losses, the 
variance in expected risks increases. Those individuals who are less likely to gain from exaggerated visits to doctors 
or from more extensive hospitalization will drop out of the pool if full coverage is offered.”).
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insurance, making it less feasible financially.122  In the welfare arena, adverse selection is an 
issue because those most likely to be long-term cases, due to their inability to engage in self-
help, are more likely to sign up in the first place.  The conventional wisdom is that needy 
individuals are the most motivated to re-enter the workforce and are therefore more likely to do 
so; they are less likely to submit to the hassles of applying for benefits and the ongoing 
conditions.  Substance abuse complicates the picture: there may be a disproportionate number of 
addicts or substance abusers in the pool of applicants, because they are disproportionately in 
need of income subsidies.  A belief that this is true would counsel in favor of requiring the 
cocaine vaccine for welfare recipients; the assumption is that the subject group is self-selected to 
have more problems with addiction.  This is a mix of utilitarian concerns (the recipient pool is 
self-selected to wasteful squandering of benefits on drugs), but it is also a paternalistic matter 
(welfare helps isolate and identify large numbers of the people most in need of help with their 
addictions, and the cocaine vaccine could help them significantly).
There are problems with applying moral hazard and adverse selection to welfare benefits.  
First, the empirical evidence suggests that the predictions of the moral hazard model do not 
materialize as expected.123  Second, the underlying assumptions about the nature of addiction and 
free will are subject to dispute,124 and these greatly affect the applicability of incentive-based 
models for predicting behavior.
The idea of requiring the cocaine vaccine of welfare recipients—especially when justified 
in part by moral hazard and adverse selection concerns—highlights again a missing piece in the 
122
 A new study, importantly, has challenged the traditional view of adverse selection as a problem for 
insurance overall, which would also be applicable in the welfare context.  See Peter Siegelman, Adverse Selection in 
Insurance Markets: An Exaggerated Threat, Fordham Univ. Research Paper 27, available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=434604 (2003) (demonstrating that the empirical basis for adverse selection concerns is 
limited, the underlying theory problematic, and alternative solutions more plausible). 
123 See Stevenson, supra note __, at __.
124 See supra notes _____ and accompanying text.
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libertarian paternalism model.  Many times the choices provided to the subject class will be in a 
context where issues of autonomy and “bounded rationality” are intertwined with concerns about  
moral hazard and adverse selection, the latter being itself a mix of paternalistic and utilitarian 
concerns.  In these cases, the historical tendency seems to be toward more paternalism and less 
libertarianism, that is, less autonomy of choice for the subject group.125  Whether Sunstein and 
Thaler would find this justifiable is unclear.  At the least, it complicates the application of the 
model.  A further complication is the common assumption, not always correct, that individuals 
needing public assistance have a track record of poor decisionmaking, as evidenced by their 
inability to be self-sufficient.126  This is the classic scenario that usually prompts more paternalist 
policy moves, but such moves are difficult to separate from simple caution about people taking 
advantage of the state’s benevolence.127
Another form of “bounded rationality” for the decisionmakers that can complicate the 
model is reciprocity.  Welfare reform movements in the last decade have reflected a strong 
reciprocity phenomenon, but it is questionable whether reliance on the “reciprocity” inclinations 
of policy makers and their voting constituents adequately addresses the problems of poverty, or 
simply exacerbates them.128
125
 Under Siegleman’s theory, this heightened paternalism may actually mitigate against the adverse 
selection problem, and therefore the moral hazard problem; the people most likely to “abuse the system” may opt 
out completely because they find the conditions too distasteful.  See generally Siegelman, supra note 116.
126
 For an interesting discussion of the “aura of suspicion” that surrounds welfare recipients (as opposed to 
other groups receiving various state subsidies, such as farmers), see Carey, supra note __ at 295-300.
127
 For example, a Welfare-to-Work program could be motivated by a mix of concerns about lifelong 
freeloaders and people who simply need extra help assimilating into the workforce.
128 See, e.g., Super, supra note __, at 857-58, discussing the current emphasis in welfare policy on 
“earning” one’s share of public assistance:
Some of the politically strongest public benefit programs--Social Security, Medicare, veterans' 
benefits, and unemployment compensation require claimants to have "earned" eligibility through 
their own work or the work of close relatives. Similarly, the food stamp program disqualifies 
many otherwise eligible college students but makes an exception for those who are working. And 
transitional medical assistance is provided for up to one year to families whose earnings have put 
them above the state's income eligibility limit for family Medicaid. This policy clearly is intended 
as a reward for work effort. In none of these cases is an exception made for people who were 
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Welfare implicates reciprocity principles of gift-and-exchange. Oded Stark and Ita Falk 
have argued that the reciprocity mechanism motivating the funding of relief for the poor is a 
utility function related in part to the gratitude of the recipients.129  When recipients of welfare 
appear ungrateful, or seem to be taking advantage of the public generosity, a tit-for-tat reaction 
ensues among the contributors.130  Persistent substance abuse, which created the recipient’s 
disability in the first place, seems to embody non-reciprocation or appreciation for the benefits 
conferred.  The response from the donors is to resent and retaliate, as a further function of the 
reciprocity.  
Stark and Falk confine themselves mostly to classic economic semantics of self-interest; 
other researches have made more of a departure, finding reciprocity in the welfare area to be 
more intuitive and irrational.  For example, in Social Preferences, Self-Interest, and the Demand 
for Redistribution,131 Christina Fong focuses on the anomaly of voter-supported redistribution 
programs, compared with traditional economic theories of rational self-interested actors and 
altruism.  Fong demonstrates, both through survey results and her own theoretical modeling, that 
self-interest and pure altruism are both inadequate models for explaining the observable attitudes 
of the populace toward wealth redistribution programs by the government.  Self-interest does not 
unable to work due to economic conditions or a lack of marketable skills: Work is treated 
(somewhat fictitiously) as dependent entirely upon a claimant's choice to work.
If one must earn eligibility for such popular benefits as Social Security, Medicare, veteran’s benefits, and 
unemployment compensation, it may not seem to be asking too much of welfare beneficiaries to earn these 
benefits in part by repudiating cocaine explicitly through acceptance of the vaccine.  In a simplistic form, 
they would be trading a small piece of autonomy, the ability to use and abuse cocaine and its derivatives 
such as crack, for the greater benefit of welfare.  It is a simple decision relying on the pressures of 
economics; for many, the inconvenience of receiving the shot would seem like a small additional marginal
cost to the already burdensome requirements and conditions for maintaining eligibility for cash benefits.   
Either you play by the government’s rules or you do not get the governments benefits; this happens to law-
abiding citizens everyday.  The analysis employed here would also pertain to supervised release, discussed 
in the previous section, to the extent that supervised release appears to be a benefit like welfare.
129
 Oded Stark and Ita Falk, On the Transfer Value of Gratitude, in Herbert Giersch, ed., REFORMING THE 
WELFARE STATE 313-26 (1997).
130 Id.
131
 Christina Fong, Social Preferences, Self-Interest, and the Demand for Redistribution,  82 J. PUB. 
ECONOMICS 225 (2001).
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explain why some of the wealthiest voters—those least likely to benefit and most likely to incur 
loss from redistribution—often favor government “tax and spend” programs that help the poor.  
Fong argues that attitudes about the ability of individuals to control their financial circumstances 
through hard work dominate the utility they find in redistribution.  Voters with stronger self-
determination beliefs want to help those suffering from unfortunate circumstances beyond their 
control, but they often want to withhold help—or punish, as in a tit-for-tat—those who do not try 
hard enough to better themselves.132
Similar conclusions appear in Reciprocity, Self-Interest, and the Welfare State,133 in 
which Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis argue that reciprocity instincts drive the public attitude 
toward poverty and welfare, as opposed to self-interest or pure altruism. Adherents of the 
classical Homo Economicus model explain the apparent mystery of redistributive programs 
either in terms of the median voters appropriating wealth from the rich in their general direction, 
attempting to move the mean income closer to the median income, or as a form of 
unemployment insurance for themselves.134  Bowles and Gintis affectionately term these 
explanations the “selfish voter theory” and then set out to show how both approaches are 
insufficient to explain the empirical data regarding the income of the voters and their attitudes 
about redistribution of income.135  Altruism also does not work well as an explanatory model for 
the current data and voter beliefs or some of the harsh measures of recent welfare reform.136
Rather, the authors posit a model of voters with “a propensity to cooperate and share with others 
132 Id.
133
 Samuel Bowles & Herbert Gintis, Reciprocity, Self-Interest, and the Welfare State, 26 NORDIC J. 
POLITICAL ECONOMY 33 (2000).
134 Id. at 35.
135 Id.
136 Id. at 37 (“We do not wish to replace the textbook Homo [Economicus], however, with a cardboard-
cutout altruist, an equally one-dimensional actor unconditionally willing to make personally costly contributions to 
others.”)
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similarly disposed, even at personal cost, and a willingness to punish those who violate 
cooperative and other social norms, even when punishing is personally costly.”137
Bowles and Gintis posit this model of behavior to explain the seemingly contradictory 
voter support for both equality and the mid-1990’s revolt against the Welfare State.138   The 
widespread perception, however accurate or inaccurate, was that many welfare recipients were 
simply working the system, too lazy to work and contribute to society, and engaging in 
irresponsible behavior.139  This led to public backlash and curtailment of benefits, according to 
the authors.  Their work relies heavily on Fong’s; they offer more solutions for policymakers to 
consider, but many of these were already put in place under the very retaliatory welfare reforms 
they criticize as somewhat irrational.
As with the moral judgments that could influence the paternalistic decisions of 
policymakers with regards to parole and probation, reciprocity can tilt the thinking of policy 
makers (and their constituents at the polls), creating a very complicated scenario for libertarian 
paternalism.  Again, it is not clear if Sunstein and Thaler’s model would caution in favor of more 
restraint by policy makers in situations where reciprocity typically bears on their decisions, or if 
it should be ignored as a fact of life, or somehow irrelevant to the model.  It does not seem 
137 Id. at 37.  There is at least one study arguing that reciprocity is actually not present in attitudes about 
welfare: Eline C.M. Van der Heijden, Jan H.M. Nelissen, Jan J.M. Potters, and Harrie A.A. Verbon, The Poverty 
Game and the Pension Game: The Role of Reciprocity, 19 J. ECONOMIC PSYCH. 5 (1998),  in which a group of 
Dutch economists and social scientists conducted experiments to assess the innate inclinations of people to 
redistribute wealth in an egalitarian manner.  Subjects played two games, a “poverty game” and a “pension game.”  
In the first, the players were given grossly unequal amounts of money and given the option to transfer increments to 
their co-players in repetitive rounds.  The pension game involved, not surprisingly, contributions from endowed 
members to the poor with the expectation of deferred returns later on.  The researchers’ main result was that they 
found “almost no evidence for reciprocity.”  
138
 The primary example of such sweeping reforms was the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity 
Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA), which culminated in the 1996 reforms, abolishing the AFDC system and 
replacing it with a program based on “welfare-to-work” and time limits for receiving public assistance.
139
 The main example of perceived irresponsible behavior is out-of-wedlock births, which appear to be 
epidemic among the unemployed poor.
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irrelevant, however, because where these attitudes are present, those in charge are more likely to 
restrict the autonomy of the subject group.
Reciprocity as a form of “bounded rationality” complicates welfare policy in another 
way: the recipients themselves make decisions clearly against their self-interest under 
circumstances where the policy makers appear too heavy-handed or unreasonable.  For example, 
Gary Tschoepe and John Hindera describe how reductions in one welfare program produced the 
result that recipients stopped using other programs for which they would still qualify.140  The 
data could be affected by a number of independent variables, of course.  There is also historical 
evidence that SSI/SSDI recipients who were cut from the program and told to reapply under new 
eligibility guidelines in 1997 often did not do so—even in cases where they would have qualified 
under the new rules.141  It appears that individuals do not seek out and apply for the benefits that 
they could receive once a previous program has been curtailed.  Attempts to force desired 
reciprocity from welfare recipients through contracts to repay the assistance if they are ever able, 
or contract-like promises to seek employment as soon as possible, can have a “crowding out” 
effect in the recipients, making them less compliant than before.142
140
 Gary J. Tschoepe and John J. Hindera, Explaining State AFDC and Food Stamp Caseloads:  Has 
Welfare Reform Discouraged Food Stamp Participation? 38 SOCIAL SCIENCE JOURNAL 435 (2001).
141 See Interim Report, Policy Evaluation of the Effect of Legislation Prohibiting the Payment of Disability 
Benefits to Individuals Whose Disability is Based on Drug Addiction and Alcoholism, Social Security Adminstration 
(Prepared by the Lewin Group, Inc.), April 28, 1998.  This was a comprehensive study conducted on behalf of the 
Social Security Administration itself in 1997 and 1998. About half the number of the targeted beneficiaries that
Social Security predicted would retain or re-establish their benefits on other bases did so, 34% instead of the 
projected 70%.  In real numbers, this means 138,000 permanently lost their benefits, while 71,000 were able to 
retain them or requalify.  About 28% never reapplied, either because they knew they would not qualify again under 
the new rules, or because of mental inability or misunderstanding. Many of the claimants did not have stable 
addresses and could not be contacted by field offices to clarify the changes that were occurring.  A common report 
was that “those most in need of the benefit are also those least able to complete the reapplication (or initial 
application) process,” because of low functional ability and “limited capacity to comply with the requirements of the 
relatively complex and time consuming reapplication process.”
142 See Ernest Fehr & Simon Gachter, Do Incentive Contracts Crowd Out Voluntary Cooperation (2001) 
(manuscript on file with author).
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This presents more of the type of situation Sunstein and Thaler discuss, because the 
bounded rationality is taking place among the subject group, not those in charge.  Applying their 
model to this case could warrant careful framing of new conditions and eligibility requirements 
so that the intended recipients of the program do not self-select away from enrolling.  Figure 2 
helps illustrate the type of framing that may face policymakers in this context.  Reciprocity is on 
top, although it does not have to be; the point is that policymakers in this context (and many 
related contexts) have at least these three values pulling at them, and perhaps more, such as 
budgetary concerns or political controversy about the legitimacy of existing welfare programs.  
There is a reasonable change, however, that policymakers would not be self-aware enough to see 
these underlying values influencing the decisions made on behalf of the welfare recipients.
Fig. 2.
Reciprocity Demands
(expectation of gratitude includes expectation of 
voluntary surrender of some autonomy)
paternalistic mistrust      utilitarian mistrust
(subject may not act in her own best interest) (moral hazard/adverse 
selection issues with subsidies)
The diagram helps illustrate a specific form of bounded rationality that could influence 
decision-makers in balancing paternalism and personal autonomy in the welfare setting.  
Reasonable paternalistic concerns are often present with those who have been unable to become 
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self-sufficient adults; behavioral economics would generate concerns about abuses of the system 
through moral hazard or adverse selection.  Reciprocity instincts could bolster both in 
rationalizing infringements on the choices of the program applicants.  A comprehensive model 
for libertarian paternalism should account for these features.143
Many see welfare as inherently paternalistic; it would be helpful to have a model like 
libertarian paternalism to assist policymakers in assessing which conditions of welfare are truly 
legitimate.144  Drug policy is also paternalistic, and the connection of drug policy to welfare 
policy is nothing new.  Vaccines, however, also present thorny issues of paternalism and 
143 See Super, supra note __, at 858-59, noting that one common condition already in place for welfare 
recipients is immunization of their children:
Most prominently, the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families statute gives states incentives to 
require most low-income families to earn means-tested cash assistance payments through 
compliance with work and other behavioral requirements.  Many states also extend their time 
limits for claimants who are working or complying with work requirements.  This vision of choice 
has significant flaws. Not only does it ignore the plight of people who choose to work but are 
unable to find employment, but it also takes an unduly narrow view of what constitutes "work" for 
low-income parents (or, to put it another way, inappropriately assumes that work outside of the 
home is the only valid choice for them). Were the work of parenting considered a way to "earn" 
benefits, the condition of low-income families in this country would be considerably better. Some 
states' categorical rules for their TANF-funded programs now make parents' compliance with 
certain minimum standards of performance (e.g., having their children immunized) a necessary 
condition of eligibility, but except in the case of very young children, none makes parenting 
sufficient to satisfy categorical requirements.  It should perhaps go without saying that the 
subjective judgments inherent in programs' definitions of what it means to "earn" a benefit 
implicate deeper problems with society's failure to value work traditionally done 
disproportionately by women. This suggests a limitation of the principle of choice.  Low- income 
people are deemed independent and capable of making their own decisions for purposes of 
declining public benefits or committing acts deemed worthy of penalties. Yet in their more 
important capacity as parents, they are deemed incapable of making responsible decisions.
Some states already require parents to immunize their children before they can earn welfare benefits. If the 
state can force a parent to immunize their child, who has no say in the decision, it seems a small step for the 
state to force the parent to take the cocaine vaccine.  This would seem especially true if the recipient had a 
history of abusing cocaine or its derivatives.
144
 Sunstein and Thaler distinguish their libertarian paternalism model from more stringent forms of 
paternalism, arguing that libertarian paternalism does not favor the elimination of choice; rather, libertarian 
paternalism supports orienting default rules and framing and anchor affects in such a way as to provide an increase 
in the welfare of the targeted class.  As illustrated in Figure 2, there are certain heuristics that affect the policy 
planners’ decisionmaking that are not accounted for the in libertarian paternalism model.  This in turn begs the 
following question: have Sunstein and Thaler really developed a new model that balances libertarian values with 
certain paternalistic duties of leaders, or have they simply affixed the adjective “libertarian” to the same paternalistic 
policies seen before in the hope of justifying more intervention into personal decisionmaking?  I maintain that their 
model makes valuable progress in the discussion of how to balance conflicting values of freedom and enlightened 
benevolence, but it is doubtful that true skeptics (those not already inclined toward a centrist position) will accept 
the result.
The Cocaine Vaccine and “Libertarian Paternalism”
51
limitations on personal autonomy; but the issues surrounding vaccines are more universal and 
not related in any special way to welfare benefits.  Universal application is the subject of the next 
section.
V. UNIVERSAL VACCINATION
Vaccinations are at once a well-settled area of law and an ongoing source of legal 
controversy.145  The Supreme Court has held unwaveringly that the government—including the 
smallest subdivisions or compartments of local authority, such as school boards—can require 
universal vaccination of everyone under its jurisdiction, and can impose sanctions for 
noncompliance.146  Such public policy has resulted in vaccination rates over 95% among 
schoolchildren and the virtual eradication of once-feared (and often epidemic) diseases like 
145
 For an excellent recent discussion of the legal history of mandatory vaccination, as well as the ongoing 
controversies surrounding the practice, see Steve P. Calandrillo, Vanishing Vaccinations, Why Are So Many 
Americans Opting Out of Vaccinating Their Children?  37 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 353 (2004).  Caladnrillo takes a 
pro-vaccination stance and offers extensive documentation of the saved lives and enormous economic savings of 
virtually eradicating once-dreaded diseases in the United States.  He expresses concern over the widespread 
misinformation circulating through the Internet about the supposed risks of vaccines and the growing convenience of 
refusing vaccines – parents in many areas simply check off a box on a mail-in card to have their children opt-out of 
normal childhood vaccinations.  See id. at 411-19.  This opt-in/opt-out convenience for childhood vaccination 
exemptions in itself provides an interesting test case for the Sunstein-Thaler model, especially given its emphasis on 
the importance of default rules and framing of choices.  See also James G. Hodge, Jr. & Lawrence O. Gostin, School 
Vaccination Requirements: History, Social, and Legal Perspectives, 90 KY. L. J. 831, 833 (2002) (excellent survey 
of history of childhood vaccinations in America and extensive documentation of state-by-state rules for exemptions, 
both statutory and judicial).
The legal history of vaccinations has had three watershed events or periods.  These were the advent of 
universal/mandatory vaccinations in every state in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, a tidal wave of 
bankrupting tort litigation against vaccine producers over occasional injuries or product defects, which drove all but 
two vaccine manufacturers from the market, and National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986.  See Michael 
Sanzo, Vaccines and the Law, 19 PEPP. L. REV. 29 (1991) for a thorough discussion.
For a discussion of the current legal problems and health risks posed by childhood vaccinations, see
Michael E. Horwin, Comment, Ensuring Safe, Effective, and Necessary Vaccines for Children, 37 CAL. W. L. REV. 
321 (2001).  Horwin is generally anti-vaccination, and argues that the public policy decisions about new vaccine 
approvals and requirements have occurred in the context of conflicts of interest, with pharmaceutical industry 
insiders controlling the policy and profiteering as a result, even where serisou public health risks remain.  The 
virulent anti-vaccination movement and relentless wave of litigation may be partly to blame for the current shortages 
of many vaccines.  See, e.g., Lars Noah, Triage In The Nation's Medicine Cabinet: The Puzzling Scarcity Of 
Vaccines And Other Drugs, 54 S.C. L. REV. 741 (2003) (arguing that the shortages are creating an urgent public 
health crisis and that increased immunity form tort liability would help mitigate the problem).
146
 Jacobson v. Massachusetts 197 U.S. 11 (1905); Zucht v. King 260 U.S. 174 (1922).
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smallpox, polio, diphtheria, etc.147 The World Health Organization heralds universal vaccination 
as one of the two greatest feats of modern public health policy (the other being availability of 
clean water for the general population).148
This rather entrenched legal situation does not mean the matter is settled social policy.149
There is growing litigation over the availability of religious and philosophical exemptions150 to 
the vaccine requirements.  There is also a growing movement in society of individuals and 
groups opposed to some or all of the vaccinations currently in use.151  As with every movement, 
the Internet has provided unprecedented means for this movement to disseminate propaganda, 
organize and counsel adherents, and track or report (sensationally) each case of a vaccine having 
deleterious effects on the recipient—usually a child.152  Cases that were once isolated incidents 
can now have celebrity status.153
147 See Hodge & Gostin, supra note __, at 886.
148 See, e.g., Calandrillo, supra note __ at 365-66; see also Hodge & Gostin, supra note __, at 878 (similar 
statement by the Center for disease Control).
149
 See Boyce, supra note ___ and accompanying text.
150 See Boone v. Boozman, 217 F. Supp. 2d 938 (E.D. Ark. 2002) (granting mother’s motion for summary 
judgment under the First Amendment, holding that a state statue requiring a Hepatitis B immunization for 
enrollment in a public school was a violation of the Establishment Clause and Fee Exercise Clause of the First 
Amendment); But cf. Wright v. De Witt School Dist., 238 S.W.2d 906 (Ark. 1965) (holding that a church member’s 
freedom to act according to their religious beliefs was subject to a reasonable regulation for the benefit of society as 
a whole).  See also Calandrillo, supra note __ 411-27.
151 See, e.g.,  Calandrillo, supra note __, at 388-408; Hodge & Gostin, supra note __, at 884-89.  Horwin, 
supra note __, is representative of this perspective, although much more sophisticated than most advocates on this 
side of the debate.
152 See, e.g.,  Calandrillo, supra note __, at 395-404; Hodge & Gostin, supra note __, at 886.  One such 
study released in the 1970’s reported a possible link between the whooping-cough vaccine and brain damage.  Rash 
Worries, ECONOMIST, April 11, 1998, at 63.  In the aftermath, several whooping-cough epidemics arose in several 
countries causing hundreds of deaths world-wide.  Id.
153 See, e.g., Horwin, supra note __, at 321-23, opening his law review comment with such a tragic 
anecdote.  Another example of the sensationalism attached to alleged linkages between vaccinations and future 
health problems can be seen in the public’s reaction to a 1998 study authored by Andrew Wakefield from the Royal 
Free Hospital and School of Medicine in London, England.  In this report, Wakefield purports to have established a 
link between the venerable MMR vaccination (a triple-target vaccination for immunizing infants against measles, 
mumps, and German Measles – commonly called rubella) and autism.  Rash Worries, Economist, April 11, 1998, at 
63.  Even after the study was called into question by both the World Health Organization and the Centers for 
Disease Control, a British panel found that demand for the vaccination had fallen by 1% within a few months of the 
study’s release.  With no sign this trend was slowing, the same panel estimated a full 2% drop in immunization rates 
in the near future.  Id.  Although a 2% decrease in immunizations does not seem worrisome at first glance, a drop in 
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The interesting thing about the anti-vaccine movement is that its arguments have not really 
changed since vaccines appeared almost 200 years ago.154  Every vaccine results in a small 
number of cases (usually statistically insignificant) of bad side effects, including sickness, 
infection with the very disease it is supposed to prevent, or death.155  Mandatory invasive 
medical procedures—i.e., shots—infringe somewhat on personal autonomy and smack of 
paternalism or even coercion.156  Some refuse to credit universal immunization with the 
disappearance of deadly diseases, attributing this phenomenon instead to a simple natural 
downturn in the historical cycle of the epidemics.157  From the beginning, much has been made 
of the fact that those championing the use of the vaccines also had a financial interest in the 
vaccine’s mass production; this criticism arises today against the pharmaceutical conglomerates 
who hold the rights to the vaccines.158
demand of that magnitude could potentially reduce the community level of vaccinate below the point where the 
population in general is sufficiently immunized against these three diseases.  Id.   
Interestingly, on February 20, 2004, ten of the original thirteen doctors included in the MMR and autism 
link study along with Wakefield submitted a retraction to the Lancet (the original journal publishing the study) 
concerning their alarming 1998 report.  BBC News, Journal Regrets Running MMR Study,(Feb. 20, 2004), available 
at http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/health/3508167.stm.  In addition, the doctors released a public retraction on 
Wednesday, March 4, 2004 citing insufficient evidence to form a causal link between the MMR vaccine and autism.  
BBC News, MMR Researchers Issue Retraction (Mar. 4, 2004), available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/health/3530551.stm.  Citing lack of a causal connection and various conflicts of interest, 
the doctors expressed regret over the negative impact to the public health caused by the study.  Anahad O’Connor, 
Researchers Retract a Study Linking Autism to Vaccination (Mar. 4, 2004), available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/03/04/science/04AUTI.html?ex=1079369909&ei=1&en=. 
154 See, e.g., Hodge & Gostin, supra note __, at 844-49, 884-89.
155 See Calandrillo, supra note __, at 389-93.
156 See, e.g., Jacobson v. Massachusetts 197 U.S. 11 (1905).  In this seminal case concerning immunization 
required by the state, Jacobson challenges a Massachusetts statute requiring smallpox vaccinations.  In support for 
his position, Jacobson argues: 
[A man’s] liberty is invaded when the state subjects him to fine or imprisonment for neglecting or 
refusing to submit to vaccination; that a compulsory vaccination law is unreasonable, arbitrary, 
and oppressive, and therefore, hostile to the inherent right of every freeman to care for his own 
body and health in such a way as to him seems best; and that the execution of such a law against 
one who objects to vaccination, not matter for what reason, is nothing short of an assault upon his 
person.
Id. at 26.
157 See Hodge & Gostin, supra note __, at 886-87; Calandrillo, supra note _-, at 395.
158 See, e.g., Horwin, supra note __, at 338-45.  Horwin offers the following terse summary of recent 
Congressional committee findings in his introduction:
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There is an irony inherent in vaccines.  The more they work, the less necessary they seem, 
especially on the individual level.159  This is why smallpox vaccinations ended several years ago; 
it seemed pointless to devote resources and incur risks to inoculate against a disease the scientific 
authorities have already pronounced “eradicated.”  The more effective a mandatory vaccine 
policy is over time, the more public resentment increases.  Dropping the policy, of course, risks 
an eventual return of the disease on an epidemic level; this may be especially true in a country 
that draws visitors and immigrants from every part of the globe, including undeveloped countries 
where pestilence still ravages the population.  This political irony is a type of “collective 
bounded rationality.”  Sometimes the whole population, or at least parts of it, cannot see through 
the immediate circumstance to take proper precautions against future risks.
The same irony about vaccines is manifest on the individual level; here the objections 
seem more rational.  Once the “herd,” so to speak, has immunity to a contagious disease (those 
spread member-to-member), there is little risk posed by an occasional individual member being 
The House of Representatives Government Reform Committee conducted an investigation into the 
background of the doctors who participated in the pivotal FDA and CDC vaccine advisory 
committees that allowed this vaccine to be approved. The investigation culminated in a committee 
report released on August 21, 2000.  According to the report, "The Committee's investigation has 
determined that conflict of interest rules employed by the FDA and CDC have been weak, 
enforcement has been lax, and committee members with substantial ties to the pharmaceutical 
companies have been given waivers to participate in committee meetings."
Id. at 324, citing Majority Staff of the Comm. on Government Reform, U.S. House of Rep., 106th Cong., 
Conflicts of Interest in Vaccine Policy Making 9-16 (Aug. 21, 2000).  One argument against this claim is 
the chronic unprofitability of vaccines for their producers.  See, e.g., Noah, supra note __, at 747-59.
159 See, e.g., Going with the Herd, ECONOMIST, April 11, 1998, at 13.  In an article dealing with mass 
vaccinations, the ‘herd immunity’ and the moral hazard problem of the ‘free-rider’ are analyzed.  The author states 
that, in fact, the benefits of mass immunization are twofold:  “Besides directly protecting individuals from infection, 
a campaign of mass vaccination provides so-called ‘herd immunity.’  This is the level of immunity in the population 
above which an epidemic cannot start a kind of firebreak for disease.”  A potential pitfall lies within this same level 
of community immunization: the moral hazard problem of the free-rider.  Once the critical level is reached (the level 
of public immunization that would prevent an epidemic of disease outbreak), the possibility that one could choose to 
not be immunized and “reap the rewards” so to speak of other’s immunization becomes a problem that must not be 
overlooked.  The problem lies, of course, with the aggregation of free-riders within the community diminishing the 
efficacy of the immunization received by those participating in the mass vaccination program.  Id.  
The significant increase in preventable-disease infections and deaths in Russia provides support for the 
ramifications of the free-rider problem in the aggregate.   “With the end of compulsory vaccination and the collapse 
of the health system, hundreds have died from diseases that were on the point of extinction there a decade ago.”  Id.  
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naturally susceptible (unvaccinated).160  The herd is immune, and members will not catch the 
disease even if the unvaccinated individual becomes infected.  At the same time, the 
unvaccinated member should have no way to become infected if the rest of the “herd” is 
immune.  This is why religious exemptions—available in all but three states161—have not led to 
new outbreaks of the diseases in the schools.162  Nearly all the other students are immune, so 
160 See, e.g., Calandrillo, supra note __, at 420-21:
This idea is based on the concept of "herd immunity."  Most vaccine-preventable diseases are 
transmitted from person to person. When a large percentage of a given population is immunized 
against a disease, that "herd community" serves as a protective barrier against the spread of 
infection to others in the group who are not immunized or whose immune systems are suppressed 
due to age or infirmity. Because herd immunity occurs at a level below a 100% immunization rate, 
it is not necessary for every single person in a community to be vaccinated. However, herd 
immunity can exist only if a sufficiently high proportion of the population is immunized such that 
the transmission of the disease is effectively interrupted. Therefore, society cannot allow every 
one of its members (or even a sizeable minority) to rely on the indirect protection afforded by 
other vaccinated members of the herd--because then community protection unravels as all try to 
"free ride" off of the benevolent acts of others.   With this reasoning as a backdrop, compulsory 
vaccination laws were enacted to ensure that all in the population received immunizations, thereby 
serving the wider public good by creating a herd community capable of protecting the weak within 
its borders. This protection is crucial because inevitably there will be individuals in society who 
cannot be immunized due to HIV, cancer, pregnancy or other serious medical conditions. 
Additionally, it takes several years for infants and young children to complete the ACIP 
recommended childhood immunization schedule. During this time, they count on the herd 
community to protect them from contracting serious illness. If an older sibling brings home a virus 
in the meantime because friends at school were not immunized, his little sister's life may be 
threatened.
161
 The three states without religious exemptions are Arkansas, Mississippi, and West Virginia.  Ross D. 
Silverman, No More Kidding Around: Restructuring Non-Medical Childhood Immunization Exemptions to Ensure 
Public Health Protection, 12 ANNALS HEALTH L. 277, 283 (2003).  Those states with a religious exemption statute 
generally require the submission of a form or affidavit claiming the opposition to the vaccinate, while other states 
require a more rigorous scrutiny of the objector’s religious practices and affiliations.  Id.  In both Kentucky and 
Arkansas, specific language has been removed requiring the religious objector to be a member of a recognized 
religious organization.  Id. at 283-92.  
West Virginia’s legislature has considered repeated bills proposing religious exemptions, but has not 
passed any to date; the most recent attempt was in March 2004.  The most recent bill passed the West Virginia 
senate by a 30-2 vote, but was tabled by a committee in the House of Delegates.  See, e.g., Bethany Holstein, 
Vaccine Bill Fails to Pass, THE INTELLIGENCER/WHEELING NEWS-REGISTER, March 13, 2004, at http://news-
register.net/news/story/0313202004_new03.asp. Interestingly, lobbyists for religious exemptions there were happy 
the bill failed, because they expected courts to find it unconstitutional; the bill would have allowed exemptions for 
those with a certificate signed by a “clergy member” authorized to perform marriages under West Virginia law.  Pro-
life groups originally proposed the exemption because they object to the vaccines for chicken pox and rubella, which 
were initially developed through stem cells, purportedly from aborted human infants.  See id.
162
 There have been outbreaks, however, in communities where a large enough population is unvaccinated.  
See Calandrillo, supra note __, at 422:
it is vital to look at opt-out rates in local communities because statewide or national numbers can 
hide areas where exemptions are dramatically higher than overall averages indicate, making it 
possible for disease pockets to spring up. For instance, even though 84% of schools in California 
boast exemption rates of less than 1%, 1 in 25 schools indicated that over 5% of their students had 
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they cannot catch the disease from the religious objectors; the religious objector is susceptible 
but very unlikely to encounter the infectious pathogen.163
Religious objections aside,164 the individual child may be at greater risk of harm from the 
vaccine itself than from the remote possibility of infection among otherwise immunized children.  
This is a matter of simple self-interest versus the collective good, of course; collective action at 
the individual’s expense is not necessarily paternalism, although it bothers some libertarians 
nonetheless.165  Yet the collective good issue is not exactly what it seems, either, for the failure 
not received their required immunizations.  Other hot spots have cropped up in Boulder, Colorado 
and in towns in Missouri and Massachusetts.  Moreover, the National Immunization Survey 
reported that in King County, Washington (a major population center home to Seattle), 24% of 
two-year olds are not fully immunized with the three most basic vaccines available (DTaP, polio, 
and MMR). The clustering of exemptions in these hot spots can lead directly to disease.  Religious 
exemptions to vaccination in Amish, Mennonite and Christian Science communities are 
responsible for the last two major outbreaks of polio in America.  During the resurgence of mumps 
that began in 1986, large outbreaks were for the most part confined to states that did not have 
comprehensive (i.e.,  kindergarten through grade 12) vaccination laws.
163 An interesting situation involving purported religious objections to the vaccine for polio has recently 
been encountered in Nigeria.  Glenn McKenzie, Official Defends Polio Vaccine Boycott (Feb. 26, 2004), at
http://story.news.yahoo.com/news?tmpl=story&u=/ap/20040226/ap_on_he_me/west_africa_polio_2.  Starting 
February 23, 2004, the World Health Organization (WHO) undertook a massive door-to-door push to vaccinate 
Nigerians against the crippling, often fatal, human polio virus.  Id.  This attempt at mass vaccination, however, has 
come under scrutiny from Kano, Niger and Zamfara – three predominately Muslim states in the country’s northern 
region – after research sponsored by state scientists detected “trace levels of estadiol, a type of the female hormone 
estrogen found in oral contraceptives, in a batch of the vaccine.”  Glenn McKenzie, Emergency Polio Campaign 
Ends, Marred by Lingering Nigerian Muslim Boycott (Feb. 27, 2004), available at http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-
bin/article.cgi?file=/news/archive/2004/02/27/international1428EST0638.DTL.  
Although United Nations and Nigerian officials repeatedly attempted to assure the Muslim citizenry the 
vaccines were safe, “stressing that any hormones found at the levels alleged would be harmless,” Islamic leaders 
declared the vaccination attempt a plot to render African females infertile.  Id.  While the WHO’s eight-year-long 
polio vaccination drive has had success – reducing occurrences of polio from an estimated 200 cases per day to just 
over 750 in all of last year – the northern region of Nigeria is still considered to be an epicenter for the world-wide 
spread of the disease.  Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo has committed to discussing the issue with the states’ 
governors before the next round of vaccinations should begin in late March of this year.  Reuters, WHO Upbeat on 
Eradicating Polio (Feb. 27, 2004), at 
http://reuters.co.uk/newsArticle.jhtml?type=healthNews&storyID=4458026&section=news. 
164
 It is important to note that religious exemptions are not the only means by which parents can object to 
compulsory vaccinations.   Individual medical and philosophical exemptions are also available in many states.  
Hodge & Gostin, supra  note _, at 883. Hodge and Gostin provide an excellent, in-depth assay of the historical 
development and social implications of compulsory vaccination programs in the United States.  In addition to 
publishing findings that vaccination requirements have indeed had a positive effect on the spread of communicable 
disease, the authors discuss modern antivaccination arguments, which often relate to a mistrust of paternalistic 
legislation requiring a default decision of mandatory vaccination.  Id. at 836.
165 See Calandrillo, supra note __, at 361:
Unfortunately, this triggers a classic collective action problem: increasing numbers of free-riders 
undermine society's ability to achieve a critical mass of people who are vaccinated. The declining 
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of one child to be immunized does not present a very great risk to other children who are.  This is 
more a problem of hyperrationality (game theory) than bounded rationality.  The result of 
autonomy in a hyperrational environment, though, can be disastrous for all the players—as with 
the Prisoner’s Dilemma—in some cases requiring government intervention.  The individual 
hyperrationality creates a collective bounded rationality.  The Sunstein-Thaler model must 
account for this phenomenon—hyperrational settings where everyone ends up worse off, even 
though bounded rationality is not present.
Necessity is the mother of invention; sometimes the inventions devised to solve an 
immediate crisis take on a more strategic benefit later on.166  Universal vaccination swept the 
nation during the century between the 1820’s and 1920’s; it mostly took the form of an eligibility 
requirement for attending the public schools, which themselves were relatively new and newly 
compulsory.167  Forcing all the children in a community to congregate in confined quarters for 
most of the day (many early schools were one-room schoolhouses) presented an epidemiological 
hazard unprecedented in history, except perhaps for seafaring voyagers in the past.  Childhood 
infections could spread like never before; it is easy to see why most local government or school 
community immunity no longer protects members in the group who have not yet been immunized 
or whose immune systems are more vulnerable due to age or infirmity. Sadly, as exemptions 
proliferate, disease "hot spots" are cropping up across the United States where large pockets of 
children have not received many or any of their mandatory immunizations. The consequences are 
not merely academic--outbreaks of measles, whooping cough, mumps, rubella and diphtheria are 
reoccurring, costing hundreds of lives and hospitalizing thousands more. Negative externalities are 
imposed upon well-intending parents, as their young infants may be exposed to life-threatening 
illnesses before they even have the ability to complete the recommended childhood immunization 
schedule. Others, often in the elderly segment of the population or those afflicted with HIV or 
cancer, have weakened immune systems that leave them susceptible despite previous vaccinations. 
Finally, the rise in exemptions imposes substantial financial burdens on the healthcare system in 
dealing with the outbreaks that do occur.
166 See generally Boyce, supra note ___.  “Eventually, say ethicists, institutions struggling with drug abuse, 
from prisons to schools, might embrace [addiction-oriented vaccinations] and healthcare workers might urge them 
on pregnant women.  Parents also might want to get their children vaccinated as a preventative measure.”
167 See Hodge & Gostin, supra note __, at 850-54.
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boards quickly adopted requirements that students be vaccinated in order to enroll.  Of course, 
enrollment was compulsory, so vaccination was de facto compulsory as well, albeit indirectly.
This indirect compulsion became the mode of universal vaccination.168  It was less and 
less necessary to compel adult vaccination; within a few years, everyone had already received 
inoculations in childhood.  Despite the persistence of a virile anti-vaccination movement 
throughout the country, it did not escalate into the type of public uproar that usually attends 
similar infringements on personal autonomy (especially ones that contradict individual rational
self-interest). 169  The vaccinations were not directly compulsory or forced.  They were merely a 
condition for something else that most viewed as a public benefit (school), even if the benefit 
was something mandatory.  In effect, there was no difference: the vaccine was functionally 
mandatory, but psychologically it did appear so, at least in an immediate sense.  In addition, the 
inoculations took place at an age when the subjects have no say about medical procedures.  This 
is paternalism in its original sense, of course, except that here it serves the public health interests 
of the state.  The age of vaccination has moved increasingly downward, to infancy, meaning that 
the subjects cannot even articulate an objection if they had one (which would be legally 
168
 There were some early examples of adult communities being ordered to receive inoculations, with 
criminal sanctions for noncompliance but these faded from the scene quickly as schoolchildren became the focus of 
the public health measures in this area.  See, e.g., Jacobson v. Massachusetts 197 U.S. 11 (1905) (holding that it is 
within the power of a state to impose regulations mandating vaccinations, and such mandate does not violate the 
individual’s rights as set forth in the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution) 
169 See Hodge & Gostin, supra note __, at 851-52:
Antivaccinationists strongly opposed the initial passage of school vaccination requirements for 
many of the same arguments discussed above, and attempted to repeal or thwart such laws through 
political routes, judicial challenges, and outright refusals to comply. In 1894, antivaccinationists in 
Rhode Island came within one vote of repealing an existing state school vaccination law. The 
Anti-Vaccination League and others in Pennsylvania narrowly failed to repeal the two-year-old 
state school vaccination law in Pennsylvania. Antivaccinationists and others, including politicians, 
physicians, and ministers in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, fought the city health officer as he attempted 
to quarantine and isolate  smallpox victims in 1894. These efforts later contributed to a revamping 
of the powers of the city health board. In Louisiana, a city physician showed high school girls a 
picture of a boy who contracted erysipelas, a painful skin disease, as a result of smallpox 
vaccination. The girls naturally refused to be vaccinated despite a mandatory policy of the state 
board of health. Parents in Haledon, New Jersey convinced the local school board to overturn a 
rule requiring children to be vaccinated in 1924. 
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irrelevant in most cases anyway).170  The subject class cannot vote or organize politically, so the 
system was not vulnerable to widespread revolt. 
Historically, then, the advent of compulsory public schools created the immediate 
occasion for universal immunization.171  The strategic result is an enduring policy whereby the 
government infringes on the personal autonomy, and eventually the rational self-interest—of 
millions of citizens without serious political repercussions.  The end result does seem to be 
wonderful—the eradication of dreaded diseases—but it is simply cloaked paternalism in its 
highest form.172
The religious and philosophical exemptions have also played an important role in the 
political staying power of the policy.  The exemptions function as a type of release valve for 
170
 The number and frequency of vaccines given to infants has also increased, which has recently become 
an additional source of controversy. See, e.g., Horwin, supra note __, at 325-26:
My parents were born in the 1930s. Members of their generation received three vaccines. I was 
born in the early 1960s and received vaccines for polio, smallpox and DPT. A child born today 
will receive five doses of DPT, four doses of polio vaccine, two doses of measles, mumps and 
rubella, three injections of hepatitis B, one shot of varicella (chicken pox), four doses of 
haemophilus influenzae b (Hib), four injections of a pneumococcal conjugate vaccine, and, 
depending on where the child lives, perhaps one shot of hepatitis A. In addition to getting more 
shots, children today get vaccines at a younger age. As displayed infra, twenty of the twenty-four 
injections (thirty of the thirty-eight different constituent vaccines) should be administered to a 
child before he or she is eighteen months old. In addition, some children may also be injected with 
up to nine different vaccines in a single day.
Calandrillo notes that this is a frequent feature of modern anti-vaccination literature, and offers this retort: 
“Vaccines do not overwhelm an infant's immune system; babies actually possess billions of immunologic 
cells . . . capable of responding to millions of different viruses and bacteria. In fact, vaccines are no more 
than a "raindrop in the ocean" of what an infant's immune system encounters every day.” Caladnrillo, supra
note __, at 398.
171
 Hodge & Gostin, supra note __, at 850-54.
172 See, e.g., Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166-67 (1944).  When deciding a case concerning child 
labor laws, the Court holds that the state has the power to take certain steps to protect the child by acting as a proxy 
for the parent: 
But the family itself is not beyond regulation in the public interest, as against a claim of religious 
liberty.  And neither rights of religion nor rights of parenthood are beyond limitation.  Acting to 
guard the general interest in youth's well being, the state as parens patriae may restrict the parent's 
control by requiring school attendance, regulating or prohibiting the child's labor and in many 
other ways.  Its authority is not nullified merely because the parent grounds his claim to control 
the child's course of conduct on religion or conscience.  Thus, he cannot claim freedom from 
compulsory vaccination for the child more than for himself on religious grounds. The right to 
practice religion freely does not include liberty to expose the community or the child  to 
communicable disease or the latter to ill health or death.
Id. at 166-67.
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pressure building up within the system; the most strident objectors get to sit out the game, for the 
most part, at little cost to themselves or the rest of the group.  A bigger problem is the growth in 
recent years of the home school movement, and its unfortunate tendency to overlap with the anti-
vaccination movement: home school children do not even need the exemptions because they are 
not enrolled in public school.173  At the same time, home school families sometimes form local 
associations or co-ops to encourage each other in their boycott of the school systems and to give 
their children a chance to socialize with other kids their age.174  When these children are 
together, though, the group as a whole may be unvaccinated, making the risk of an old-fashioned 
outbreak more substantial.  From the Sunstein-Thaler perspective, the general policy 
arrangement could be characterized as a default rule of vaccination with an opt-out alternative, 
which means that most people will end up getting vaccinated; this is the desirable outcome.  
When home schooling comes into the equation, however, the default rule flips, which will lead to 
a decrease in vaccinations.
Adult vaccinations are typically offered as an opt-in program, with the default being no 
immunization. The seasonal flu vaccines are an example; these are underutilized.175  The 
strategic game in these cases, however, differs from the scenario with children’s vaccines.  Most 
173 For an analysis of the interrelationship between mandatory vaccinations, public schools, exemptions on 
the ground of individual rights and past success of immunization programs, see Silverman, supra note __, at 277-78.  
The childhood immunization program “relies upon three separate components: legislatures to pass laws . . . state 
health departments and boards to help refine the mandates and exemptions processes, and school districts and 
individual schools to carry out such mandates.”  Id.  
Silverman argues that the increasing number of exemptions allowed from the compulsory immunization 
programs (religious or otherwise), when considered in the aggregate, pose a serious threat to the past success of 
these vaccination programs.  Silverman calls for “proactive and collaborative solutions [to the problem of mass 
exemptions]… rather than the complete elimination of the ability of those seeking exemption to receive relief under 
the law….”  Id. at 293.
174 See Hodge & Gostin, supra note __, at 856-57, discussing the home school movement and its 
interrelation to vaccination of children.
175 See generally Dale W. Bratzler,  B. F. Christiaens,  Katherine Hempstead,  & Kristin L. Nichol, 
Immunization For Seniors¸ 30 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 128 (2002) (discussing the problems of underutilization of flu 
and pneumococcal pneumonia vaccines among seniors).  The most common adult deaths from vaccine-preventable 
diseases are due to influenza and pneumococcal disease.  See id. at 128.
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of the population has not received inoculations against the flu, so the likelihood of exposure is 
much higher; it would be in any individual’s self-interest to be one of the few who are 
immunized, in contrast to the situation with schoolchildren.  
Seniors are particularly susceptible to influenza and the more serious sequelae; yet most 
do not get the vaccines.176   This may be due in part to suspicion about newer medical therapies, 
or an aversion to needles, or simply forgetting or not knowing about the vaccine.  This might be 
an instance where libertarian paternalism would be particularly useful.  The subject class would 
be better off—to the best of our scientific knowledge, although there is some controversy—if 
they were inoculated, even apart from the collective epidemiological issues.177  The political 
fallout from forced adult vaccinations can be great, especially if the media sensationalizes cases 
of bad side effects,178 so it may be an occasion when libertarian paternalism would falter.  
176 See id. at 130 (“In 2001, only 64.3% of the elderly had received an influenza vaccination, and only 53% 
had ever received a pneumococcal vaccination.  These rates are far  short of the Healthy People 2010 goal of 
vaccinating 90% of this population against these diseases.”).
177 See id., discussing the benefits of the vaccines and the urgent need for more widespread vaccination of 
adults, particularly seniors:
Influenza vaccine is safe and effective.  Among elderly persons, the benefits of vaccination 
include reductions in hospitalizations and deaths and health care cost savings. In one six-year 
serial cohort study in a Minneapolis--St. Paul area health maintenance organization, influenza 
vaccination of the plan members was associated with a 39% reduction in hospitalizations for 
pneumonia or influenza, a 32% reduction in hospitalizations for all respiratory conditions, a 27% 
reduction in hospitalizations for congestive heart failure, and a 50% reduction in deaths from all 
causes.  Administration of the influenza vaccine was also associated with cost savings of $73 per 
person vaccinated.  Other studies have also demonstrated reductions in hospitalizations and deaths 
as well as cost savings.  Pneumococcal diseases are also important causes of morbidity and 
mortality. Pneumococcal pneumonia is responsible for 100,000-175,000 hospitalizations and 
7,000-12,000 deaths each year.  Invasive pneumococcal disease is responsible for 50,000 cases of 
bacteremia and 3,000 cases of meningitis each year.   Immunization with the pneumococcal 
polysaccharide vaccine provides substantial benefits for the elderly. Observational studies have 
shown that, among elderly persons, vaccination reduces bacteremic infections by about 75% and is 
associated with cost savings of about $8.27 per person vaccinated.  A two-year cohort of elderly 
persons with chronic lung disease suggested that the benefits for this group might be even greater. 
In that study, vaccination was associated with a 43% reduction in hospitalizations for pneumonia, 
29% fewer deaths, and cost savings of $294 per person vaccinated.
178 See id. at 131, discussing the scenario in Montana, where the problem of underutilization of adult 
vaccines is particularly acute:
Montana has the fourth fastest growing population of adults aged 65 years and older. It is 
considered a frontier rural state. In many small communities, over 50% of the residents are 65 or 
older. The fastest growing segment in that group consists of adults 80 years and older. Providing 
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Childhood vaccines, though, have reached a successful type of political equilibrium.  They are 
mandated indirectly, a condition of something else; almost all children are vaccinated as a result.
Enter the cocaine vaccine.  Legally, it is well-settled that governments and agencies can 
simply require immunizations.179  The historical model that seems to have struck the best 
political equilibrium is to target minors, and to make it a prerequisite for something else that is 
nearly universal and considered a benefit.  The tied product, to borrow an analogy from antitrust 
law, could be high school, university (although this removes the feature of targeting minors), 
extracurricular activities (athletics, clubs, drama, and music cover a lot of students),180 or even 
the child tax credit.  Of course, individual private schools and colleges would be on even safer 
ground, legally and politically, if they required the cocaine vaccine for entering students each 
year or each semester, assuming there is no race to the bottom problem with health-based 
health care for the population is of primary concern, as 18.5% of the citizens have no insurance 
coverage. Many seek medical attention only when a problem has become a crisis. This situation 
leaves hospital emergency rooms to provide primary care, the highest priced care available. Little 
is done to prevent disease in economically depressed social situations, and people in such settings 
do not have the income to obtain routine health care. The emphasis in Montana has been to cover 
children through the Children's Health Insurance Program (CHIP) and to offer expanded 
qualifying criteria for participants. This program has been very successful, but state budget 
problems are placing this program on the chopping block in an upcoming special session of the 
legislature.  Immunization of seniors has not become a requirement by statute in Montana--a state 
that meets in legislative session only every other year. In the 2001 session, a bill that would have 
required immunization of nursing home residents for influenza and pneumococcal disease was 
defeated by efforts of the nursing home industry, whose advocates argued that they did not want 
an additional state mandate.
This brings back memories of the swine flu vaccines ordered by President Ford in the early 1970’s and the 
subsequent political backlash.
179 See generally Hodge & Gostin, supra note __, at 853-61 (discussing major appellate court decisions on 
the constitutionality of mandatory vaccines); Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 11.
180
 Verona School Dist. v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995) (holding a mandatory drug testing did not violate the 
student’s Fourth Amendment rights when required for participation in extra-curricular activities); Bd. of Educ. v. 
Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 828 (2002) (upholding constitutionality of random testing of students participating in non-
athletic competitive extracurricular activities). For a recent, thorough case note on the latter, see Jacob L. Brooks, 
Constitutional Law - Suspicionless Drug Testing Of Students Participating In Non-Athletic Competitive School 
Activities: Are All Students Next? 4 WYO. L. REV. 365 (2004) (criticizing the majority decision in Earls and 
predicting its application to universal drug testing for all students). As radical as universal vaccination of high 
schoolers against cocaine may sound, it is likely that it would receive constitutional treatment similar to involuntary 
drug testing in similar contexts.  
The Cocaine Vaccine and “Libertarian Paternalism”
63
enrollment requirements.181  Colleges could boast to parents (who exert financial control over 
many college students) that their campuses are cocaine-free as a result; students who object to 
the vaccine have plenty of alternatives elsewhere.
The cocaine vaccine, however, is not like any other vaccine.  Every childhood vaccine 
combats some physical contagion, a pathogenic organism that spreads itself (at least partly) 
through human carriers.182  Cocaine abuse and addiction are analogous to this, at best.  Cocaine 
use spreads through social interactions, but the etiology is psychosocial; there is no “cocaine 
germ” that infects the unwary against their will.  Most people do not use cocaine, and this is by 
choice.  One could say that the “default rule” for cocaine use in our culture is nonuse, with an 
opt-in of use/abuse, with the cost of legal penalties.  One cannot easily stop the spread of a 
regular disease by banning its infection and imposing stiff penalties; but one might deter the use 
of controlled substances if the penalties are high enough (which clearly they are not, given the 
widespread violations, but for good reason—sanctions impose costs on the rest of us).  So there 
are alternatives to vaccination against cocaine that are unavailable with most other vaccines; this 
is the redundancy problem (again), but more serious because of the greater scale of the 
181
 Colleges traditionally have required certain vaccinations for enrollment, usually without significant legal 
challenges.  Controversies do arise, however, when an administration adopts new vaccination requirements.  See,
e.g., Lauren Gong, Immunization Controversy: Should Colleges Require the Bacterial Meningitis Vaccine?,
STANFORD DAILY, March 4, 2004, at
http://daily.stanford.edu/tempo?page=printable&repository=0001_article&id=13409. 
182
 The one notable (and important for our analysis) exception is Tetanus, also knows as lockjaw, an 
infection usually transmitted through a puncture wound from a rusty nail or other contaminated source.  Tetanus 
poisons nerves and causes muscle spasms, mostly in the next and jaw.  It can lead to breathing and hear t problems, 
and death in some cases.  See Calandrillo, supra note __, at 370, noting that Tetanus “claimed 601 American victims 
as recently as 1948.”  Current numbers are less than forty cases per year.  Id. (“[W]orldwide tetanus still kills 
300,000 newborns and 30,000 birth mothers each year who lack proper vaccination.”).
Tetanus, however, is not very contagious at all, despite being highly infectious once inside the body; yet 
vaccinations against it are nearly universal in the United States.  This is significant because it serves as an important 
precedent for a vaccine against cocaine, despite the lack of “contagiousness” for the drug or addiction.  In other 
words, contagion itself does not appear to be the sine qua non of a mandatory policy for any given vaccine.  
Contagion certainly bolsters the public health argument in favor of mandatory vaccines, but it is not necessary; 
neither the anti-vaccination lobby nor the tort liability lawsuits seem to single out tetanus vaccines as particularly 
unnecessary or unjustified.  The low-contagiousness/high-infectiousness feature of tetanus may, in fact, provide a 
useful analogy to the deleterious effects of cocaine – not contagious, but highly infectious (habit-forming, health-
impairing).
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immunization project under consideration.  There is another difference as well: no one wants to 
get polio or measles, but several million people want the effects of cocaine.183
The cocaine vaccine also presents a problem of practicality not present with childhood 
vaccines: so far, it is not permanent.  The effects last a few months and then fade.184  The flu 
vaccine is similar in this sense, requiring a new shot every winter, and this may account for its 
underutilization.185  In any case, it does not seem financially practicable or politically feasible to 
round up everyone for a TA-CD shot three or four times a year.
This problem would be less daunting, however, if narrower groups were the focus of the 
immunization, groups at higher risk for abuse.  For example, vaccination of a significant portion 
of high schoolers, or entering/returning college students, might substantially reduce cocaine 
consumption for a season of life when the bad habits often start.186  Even if this is only a chunk 
183
 In this sense, of course, the cocaine vaccine is more analogous to vaccines (now available) against 
Hepatitis B and Herpes, which are generally transmitted through easily avoidable activities.  Individuals could 
simply refrain from risky activities (needle drug use, unprotected non-monogamous sex) instead of getting the 
vaccine; yet these vaccines seem less controversial than the cocaine vaccine.  It is not immediately clear why this 
would be the case.  Sex overall may be a socially desirable activity (observe the short lifespan of non-sex societies 
like the Shakers), but unprotected non-monogamous sex is not necessarily a socially desirable activity.  The 
difference must lie in the illegality of cocaine and the resulting stigma that attaches; unprotected sex does not have 
this level of official taboo associated with it.
184
 Yet another factor to be considered is the effect of the “imperfect vaccination.”  A recent article 
addressing the possible effects of an imperfect vaccine – one that is not fully effective in immunizing against the 
intended infection – highlights the potential consequences of this problem. Unintended Consequences, ECONOMIST, 
Dec. 15, 2001, at 64.  This article analyzes the vaccine for malaria.  Malaria is responsible for approximately three 
thousand deaths worldwide per year, with as many as 70% of the victims small children.  Id.  While a vaccination 
against malaria does exist, the physiology of the infection is markedly different from other commonly immunizable 
diseases.  Malaria, as opposed to the common flu, is not bacterially or virally based; rather it is transferred through 
small, single-celled organisms, making potential vaccinations less effective.  Id.  
The ineffectiveness of the vaccine can, in certain circumstances, promote the spread of the disease rather 
than curtailing its growth.  By infecting partially-immunized hosts, the disease can increase in virility without 
dramatically shortening the lifespan of the host, resulting in a more deadly form of the infection.  The long-term 
results from partial immunization are that those who elect to be immunized are actually not incurring a significant 
benefit over those who are not immunized, and perhaps more importantly, those who are not immunized are at an 
increased risk from the resulting enhanced strains of the disease.  Id.
185 See Bratzler et al., supra note __, at 128-32 (documenting and discussing the underutilization but not 
finding a suitable explanation).  The fact that is it in one’s self-interest to avoid the flu does illustrates an example of 
the type of  “bounded rationality” that Sunstein and Thaler would use to justify some kind of “nudge” in the right 
direction from policymakers. 
186
 This was, in fact, part of the justification for singling out high school athletes for random drug testing in 
Vernonia; Justice Scalia opens the majority’s decision observing that the trial court had made a finding that student 
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of the nationwide cocaine market, it could be a big enough chunk to disrupt cocaine’s social 
prevalence overall, especially if its prevalence in other sectors is a holdover from the users’ high 
school or college days.
Such a move could affect the cocaine market overall.  As a hypothetical, suppose that 
instead of the targeted immunization program discussed in the last paragraph, the entire 
population of possible cocaine users were immunized for even a four-month period.187  Suppose 
further that this caused the cocaine market to bottom out for that period, which seems plausible.  
If cocaine is indeed the number one street drug, the national infrastructure for distribution must 
be comprehensive, almost Byzantine.  A four month shock to the system could wreak havoc in 
the underworld.  Product could not be sold; uplines would go unpaid; profits would disappear 
temporarily, while overhead costs of the distribution system would remain and would go 
uncovered.  The shock could disrupt the market for some time, even after everyone’s immunity 
wore off.  The sudden surplus of product could significantly reduce the profitability of sellers, 
and more importantly, producers and importers.  From the standpoint of law enforcement, this 
sounds like a dream: surplus contraband would be warehoused in centralized, concentrated 
locations while the distribution downline is shut down to weather the bad market conditions.188
athletes were the group “leading the drug culture” in the high school. See Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 649.  Many of the 
arguments used to justify involuntary drug testing for designated groups, whether student athletes, parolees, certain 
employees, public housing tenants, military personnel, etc., would be applicable to administering the cocaine 
vaccine to the same individuals.  The groups or individuals currently subjected to random drug testing are the most 
likely candidates for the cocaine vaccine.
Each of these groups, however, is subjected to drug testing for different reasons, which is very close to the 
underlying point of this article.  Parolees have curtailed rights and privileges generally; air traffic controllers or 
pilots would endanger large numbers of innocent bystanders if they performed their duties with impaired judgment; 
employees and tenants are in a voluntary relationship, and therefore not necessarily “forced” to do anything; and 
student athletes are the social vanguards of drug problems in the high schools.  In none of these cases are the 
individuals at “high risk” in the sense of being particularly vulnerable to the allure of drugs or the snare of addiction.  
The risks are externalities. 
187
 This could probably exclude young children and the elderly. 
188
 This shutdown in cocaine distribution may not only have the immediate effect of stemming the flow of 
illicit drugs onto our streets, but may decrease crime rates as well.  “It is undeniable that cocaine use is related to 
crime.  In 1998, 32.9 percent of individuals aged 15 and above who were arrested for non-drug violent and property 
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In addition, a shock to the market distribution network could reduce availability of the drug for 
some time, which in turn would affect consumption, at least temporarily.  The social nature of 
drug abuse could mean that even a temporary drop in consumption everywhere could abate the 
fad; people might move on to other things in the meantime.
The other things they move on to, of course, might be other drugs.  This is one of the 
preeminent objections to the cocaine vaccine: people might simply switch to something else.  
The answer to this, at least with regard to widespread or universal vaccination, is twofold.  First, 
while some people might move on to other drugs (methamphetamines, heroin, etc.), some of the 
people would move on to other legal (and less dangerous) ways to have fun.  This would be at 
least a partial victory for champions of the drug war.  Second, one must consider the market 
situation and distribution infrastructure.  The number one street drug is likely to be the most 
available.  Switching from cocaine to other illegal drugs would mean switching to something less 
available, for which there is less of a distribution network.  Drug dealers are no drug stores; they 
do not have a vast selection of products behind the counter.  It is a high-stakes, high risk business 
where there is incentive to specialize in only what is most profitable, rather than offering a 
diversified product menu.  Switching, therefore, may not be so easy.  An alternative may be 
harder to find or have a weaker supply chain compared to cocaine.  Limited supply in the face of 
offenses and screened for illegal drug use as a part of the Arestee Drug Abuse Monitoring program tested positive 
for cocaine.”  Jeff Desimone, The Effect of Cocaine Prices on Crime, 39 ECONOMIC INQUIRY 627 (2001).  Desimone 
posits that current law enforcement techniques targeted at illicit drug use are merely attempts to alter the street-level 
price of the drugs, thereby reducing criminal activity.  Id.  The author also points out that the opposite effect may in 
fact materialize: addicts could simply increase their criminal activity (in the form of property crimes such as theft, 
burglary, etc) in order to cover increased drug expenditures.  See id. at 628.  Through extensive econometric 
modeling, it is the author’s contention, however, that there are “significant negative effects of cocaine [price 
increases] on all but one of the seven index crime categories included in the Uniform Crime Reporting program of 
the Federal Bureau of Investigation.”  Id.  
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increased demand could mean higher prices; less committed consumers may even drop out of the 
market due to a price increase.189
Switching involves other kinds of “switching costs.”  A new drug is unfamiliar; the user 
could find its side effects unwelcome.  Buying from new vendors is risky.  High-stakes 
businesses depend on a high level of trust.  In a world of sting operations and undercover agents, 
the risk of looking for another drug from another distributor presents special problems.  These 
problems would confront both consumers and street pushers alike; the pushers would be 
scrambling to replace their product line and must turn to a new set of producers, importers, and 
suppliers.  Of course, this might be an argument for temporary periods of extremely high 
sanctions and concentrated waves of law enforcement against a single drug.  Anything causing a 
serious interruption in the demand of the most popular street drug for a few months could create 
similar interruptions to the hidden market mechanisms, and the same opportunities for 
undercover agents to catch the surging number of “switchers” (both consumers looking for new 
drugs from new dealers and distributors looking for new suppliers for new drugs).  This assumes 
good coordination and planning, of course. 
The potential switching problem, therefore, is really a double-edged sword.  The 
possibility of switching may significantly undermine the original purpose of the vaccine, 
especially if many people switch to some more dangerous drug for which there is no vaccine.  At 
the same time, switching costs can be high, especially when moving from the market dominator 
189 See, e.g., Jeff Desimone & Matthew C. Farrelly, Price and Enforcement Effects on Cocaine and 
Marijuana Demand, 41 ECONOMIC INQUIRY 98, 99 (2003) (“In theory, cocaine and marijuana act as substitutes in 
the production of intoxication but also can provide complementary intoxicating effects.”).  The existence of this 
relationship, while somewhat uncertain from the empirical evidence, has significant effects on the effectiveness of 
policies targeted at one drug or the other.  For example, the increase in marijuana possession arrests in the period of 
1990-1997 may have, on the one hand, “reinforced any effect of cocaine use if the two drugs are complements but 
had [the] unintended counteractive effect [of increasing cocaine consumption] if they are substitutes.”  Id.  
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to a less popular and less available alternative.190  Widespread synchronized switching provides 
an unbelievable opportunity for undercover law enforcement at every level of the drug trade.
The redundancy argument also has a flip side.  While it is true that people can avoid the 
“disease” in question simply by free choice, more conveniently than one can avoid exposure to 
outbreaks of pathogenic diseases by being a recluse, millions of people do not choose to abstain 
from the drug.  Similarly, while the government can deter most people from cocaine use by 
imposing hefty criminal sanctions, these sanctions are costly to society as well.  Prisons are 
costly to run; prosecutions are costly to try.  Incarcerating people in their prime years is costly to 
the workforce and the market for consumer goods; incarcerated parents are extremely costly for 
their families and the state (when foster care is required).  Deterrence comes at a price; it is 
unclear how this price would compare with the cost of widespread vaccination.
The cocaine vaccine shares the hyperrationality problem with the other childhood 
vaccines, at least on the individual level.  Many would object to receiving the cocaine vaccine on 
the grounds that they were never going to use cocaine anyway, which is plausible in most cases.  
The risks of getting vaccinated—a potential allergic reaction, the slight chance of a tainted 
vaccine supply—seem unnecessary, even onerous.  This is the same argument, though, against 
anyone getting any other vaccine, once most of the population is immune as a whole.  The 
element of “choice” makes no real difference to the “redundancy” or superfluity argument—in 
both cases, the individual may not need the vaccine enough to justify even a remote risk of 
190
 It is possible, of course, that switching would occur toward marijuana, but this would be a downgrade in 
intensity for those used to cocaine and crack; it is not certain that it would be the first choice as a substitute.  There 
is, interestingly, a new pharmacological treatment for marijuana (or more specifically, for THC, the active 
ingredient), which block THC reception in the brain. See, e.g., Patrick Zickler, Cannabinoid Antagonist Reduces 
Marijuana’s Effects in Humans, NIDA NOTES, Vol. 17 No. 3 (Oct. 2002), available at: 
http://www.drugabuse.gov/NIDA_Notes/NNVol17N3/Cannabinoid.html. This differs from the cocaine vaccine, of 
course; the Cannabinoid Antagonist (a.k.a. SR141716) does not work in the bloodstream or induce the body to 
produce antibodies, but rather attaches to the THC receptors n the brain, blocking ingested THC from its target.  In 
clinical studies, the Antagonist significantly reduces the felt effects of marijuana in the subjects.
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serious harm from it.  This is true whether we are talking about polio or addiction.  The answer 
to the objection is the same in both cases: there is a greater good achieved if the harm can be 
eradicated; enough unvaccinated individuals in the aggregate can lead to an epidemic, whether in 
the form of an outbreak of pestilence or a widespread, costly social problem.
The fact that cocaine use is a voluntary behavior and not an invasive, communicable 
pathogen, however, could prompt courts to categorize this vaccine differently than others.191
Some may group it together with other pharmacological treatments for addiction (like 
methadone).  Alternatively, some courts may group the cocaine vaccine together with other pre-
191
 A similar problem is posed by the new Herpes vaccine.  This new vaccine, designed to prevent genital 
herpes, could eliminate the majority of herpes cases in America, according to widespread reports in the news media.  
See, e.g., Molly M. Ginty, Herpes Vaccine Might Protect Female Teens, WOMEN’S ENEWS, (March 7, 2004), at: 
http://www.womensenews.com/article.cfm/dyn/aid/1741/context/archive; New Vaccine Prevents Herpes in Women,
CNN.COM/HEALTH, (November 20, 2002), at: http://www.cnn.com/2002/HEALTH/11/20/herpes.vaccine; Herpes 
Vaccine Gives Sufferers New Hope, Click2Houston.com (September 25, 2003), at: 
http://www.click2houston.com/health/2477951/detail.html. Herpes, the most common sexually transmitted disease, 
affects more than forty-five million Americans, according to the Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). 
The Herpes vaccine presents special policy issues or problems of its own.  First, there is the issue of 
redundancy or voluntariness – the disease is somewhat avoidable with certain self-imposed restrictions in personal 
lifestyle.  This is a problem held in common with the cocaine vaccine; neither Herpes nor cocaine addiction spread 
like measles, mumps, or polio.  This factor introduces a possible stigma for those who volunteer for the vaccine 
against cocaine or Herpes; onlookers might ask why the person cannot simply make safer decisions. 
In addition, the vaccine works only for women – girls, in fact – as clinical test have indicated it produces 
no results in males or those who have already contracted any variety of Herpes (HSV-I or HSV-2). See also Matt 
Leingang, Vaccine Testing Short of Subjects: Most Volunteers Already Have Form of Herpes, CINCINNATI 
ENQUIRER (February 25, 2004).  The HSV -1 virus, oral Herpes (cold sores near the mouth) affects many children 
before age twelve or fourteen.  This means that health care providers must administer the vaccine to girl by the age 
of ten or twelve in order for it to be effective.  Parents and policy makers thus face the awkward scenario of 
immunizing young girls a few years before they become sexually active, with a vaccine that anticipates their 
participation in a sexually permissive society.  Many parents may not like to think about such things while their 
daughters are in elementary school.  The Herpes vaccine also presents one of the first situations where a public 
health issue that affects both genders is preventable by immunizing only one of the genders (girls).  The question of 
whether a vaccine could or should be mandatory for females alone would be a constitutional case of first impression.
From a public health standpoint, a vaccine that prevents disease afflicting millions of Americans may be an 
opportunity that society cannot pass by.  Incorporating the Herpes vaccine into the myriad of vaccines required of 
elementary age school children could be a public health triumph.  At the same time, rates of infection for genital 
Herpes are falling, while other STD’s are on the rise. See, e.g., David Wahlberg, Herpes Rate On The Decline;
Georgia Leads Nation In Syphilis, ATLANTA JOURNAL-CONSTITUTION, March 8, 2004, at:
http://www.ajc.com/health/content/health/0304/09cdcstd.html; Lawrence K. Altman, Genital Herpes Declined 17%, 
Surveys Show, N.Y. TIMES, March 9, 2004 at A19, at: 
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=FA0F14FF3C5A0C7A8CDDAA0894DC404482 (CDC reporting 
that HSV-2, most common cause of genital herpes, fell 17 percent in 1990's, while syphilis rates jumped in 2003 for 
third consecutive year).
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emptive strategies of the war on drugs, like mandatory drug testing, which receive more 
searching scrutiny from courts than mandatory childhood shots.192
The notion of mandating the cocaine vaccine for everyone, or at least for all the people in 
a certain age group, puts certain unanswered questions about libertarian paternalism in stark 
relief: how to handle situations where most people would make appropriately self-maximizing 
choices, but where personal autonomy is in tension with other policy goals focused on the 
collective good.  The tension is more pronounced when one considers that alternative means for 
addressing the larger social problem are already in place, like the criminal justice system is with 
drugs.
The concerns would likely focus on the underlying assumption that it is simply 
unnecessary to immunize most youngsters against cocaine.  This assumption, however, has an 
uncomfortable overlap with the similarity between the subject class and those making the 
decisions.  When we speak of parolees and probationers, or even welfare recipients, there is less 
certainty, or perhaps less passion, about the needlessness of the cocaine vaccine, despite the fact 
that there other means of ensuring that these groups abstain as well—such as monitoring and 
enforcement through drug testing.  With these latter two classes, there may be less of a concern 
about documenting the empirical likelihood that a significant number of individuals would make 
bad decisions, which is the justification libertarian paternalists otherwise use when intervention 
seems necessary.
There is mistrust associated with parolees and probationers based on moral 
approbation.193  There is a distrust leveled at welfare recipients because of fears that they will be 
192 See, e.g., Robert J. Aalberts, Drug Testing Tenants: Does it Violate Rights of Privacy? 38 REAL PROP., 
PROBATE & TRUST J. 479, 485- 87 (2003) (discussing the analogous rules in the context of employee drug testing); 
see generally Mark De Bernadino et al., Guide to State and Federal Drug-Testing Laws 19-347 (10th ed. 2001) 
(discussing case law and statutory provisions about employee drug testing across jurisdictions).
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opportunistic rational actors (the moral hazard/shirking problem), as well as reciprocity-based 
demands for gratitude and some voluntary yielding of personal autonomy.194  With more 
universal vaccinations, however, the policy makers themselves necessarily identify more closely 
with the subject class; there is more empathy and more of a mirroring effect (seeing oneself or 
one’s own traits in the other, a feeling of relation).  These types of identification lead those in 
charge to trust the judgments of the subject class more, and to be more hesitant about infringing 
on their autonomous judgments.  While this may seem to be simple Bayesian attribution, the 
objective similarity to a type of nepotism in judgment is troubling.195  Libertarian paternalism, as 
a model, offers little guidance about how to handle class-wide nepotistic instincts among 
policymakers.  Usually overt nepotism among policymakers is troubling because it presents a 
conflict of interest, that is, the policymaker’s self-interest is opportunistically exploiting the 
power of the office or leadership position.  Favors to one’s relations and friends are favors to 
oneself, in more ways than one.  
In the context of vaccines and drug policy, however, the nepotism looks less like self-
interest and more like another form of bounded rationality: the tendency to give the benefit of the 
doubt to people similar to oneself.  The flip side of this tendency is the predilection to demand 
more assurance of trustworthiness from those who are different or in a dissimilar situation in life, 
even where there is little objective basis for this.  For example, if one considers the social class 
193 See supra notes __ and associated text.
194 See supra notes __ and associated text.
195
 “Nepotism” seems like a strong word in this case—this is certainly not intended to imply that a few 
privileged (related) individuals would receive special treatment or benefits, as the term usually connotes.  On the 
other hand, the idea of sympathy or empathy that emanates from a sense of group identification, which in turn would 
influence the decisions of policy makers, does seem better captured by the word “nepotism” than simply 
“favoritism” or some other term that does not include a sense of personal identification based on shared 
characteristics.  The problem is that I use the term: 1)  to refer to a type of favoritism bestowed on a very large, 
diffuse class—in fact, the majority class in this case, and 2) to refer to something that may operate subconsciously in 
the decisionmaking process of those in charge, whereas the classic sense of “nepotism” involved something very 
intentional, I think.  Both of these factors could lead some readers to object to the use of the term; but even 
substituting another term should not change the underlying point.
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among which cocaine is most popular (for it is an expensive drug), there may be more reason for 
concern about college freshman than parolees and probationers—at least from a statistical or 
Bayesian perspective.196  This way of thinking is likely to be counter intuitive for policymakers, 
however, and in that sense is a form of bounded rationality that could taint the results of the 
libertarian paternalist approach.
To prognosticate realistically for a moment, it seems far less likely that universal 
vaccinations will be implemented (or even vaccination of an entire age group), than would be the 
case for the previous two groups discussed.  There would be huge political hurdles, immense 
logistical problems, spiraling costs for the supplies of vaccines and the safe and effective 
administration of shots, and strict scrutiny from the media if anything went wrong anywhere.  
Overall, it seems unlikely to happen.197  As a thought experiment, however, it provides a useful 
196
 This, of course, has been a frequent charge made against the extraordinarily high penalties for crack as 
opposed to other more dangerous drugs—namely, that crack is inexpensive and more widely used among poor, 
urban minorities.  Some may see the draconian sanctions for crack possession, therefore, either as intentional racist 
policy or a less intentional (but still race or class-based) lack of concern or mercy for defendants in these cases. This 
may not be true, of course; the racial impact issue may have been mostly a coincidence, if the draconian measures 
were implemented precisely because crack was less expensive, more widely used, and therefore more difficult to 
deter.  See, e.g., Judge Louis F. Oberdorfer, Mandatory Sentencing: One Judge's Perspective—2002, 40 AM. CRIM. 
L. REV. 11, 16 (2003) (contending, “There is no material pharmacological difference between crack cocaine or 
powder cocaine,” thus making the great disparities in respective sentences for the two variants particularly 
troubling).
197
 A caveat, of course, is that states and municipalities have enjoyed a high level of autonomy in their 
vaccine policies over the years, with courts being very deferential even to decisions of local school boards in this 
regard.  Thus, it is possible that “universal vaccination” (as I have used the term, which is not technically universal) 
could be adopted in individual locales, school districts, or even states, where some of these political and logistical 
obstacles would not be so insurmountable.
Perhaps a more telling indicia of the likelihood of universal vaccination for, say, high schoolers is the fact 
that by 1999, “only 2.87% of schools tested athletes for drugs and only . 57% tested other extracurricular activities. 
By 2001, the numbers had risen to 4.95% and 3.30% respectively.”  Brooks, supra note __, at 394 n. 261.  Brooks is 
concerned nonetheless:
Few can deny the Court has moved closer to approving the testing of all students as its reasoning 
evolved from T.L.O. to Vernonia to Earls. Certainly, the legitimate expectations of privacy held 
by all students can be no more than students on the speech team or in band, especially since all 
students undergo some form of health screenings and have to submit to vaccinations in order to 
attend school. Additionally, the nature of the invasion is minimal according to the Court. Finally, 
the Court has acknowledged that the nature and immediacy of the government's concerns justify 
testing even when an identifiable drug problem is not present.  In short, drug testing the entire 
student body might just be another routine procedure, like scoliosis screenings, hearing checks, 
and MMR shots.
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insight into the Sunstein-Thaler model: the model requires policymakers first to identify 
situations where the subject class is at high risk for making bad decisions.  There are no 
safeguards, however, to prevent policymakers from giving more benefit of the doubt to groups 
with which they identify more closely than to those who are less similar.198
VI. AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLERS 
Some jobs involve high stakes; not always for the worker himself (as might be the case 
with mercenaries, professional gamblers, or stunt men), but for everyone else.  I select air traffic 
controllers somewhat randomly as an example.199  Every day, they have thousands of lives in 
their hands, to some degree.  Of course, their judgment could be subject to override by other 
controllers if they make mistakes, or even by individual pilots; as in the comedy film “Airplane,” 
where the pilot manages to land the plane safely despite the control tower worker who “picked 
the wrong week to give up ____” (the joke changes throughout the movie).200  In general, 
though, the pilots rely upon information from the control towers and obey their directives about 
Id.
198
 Although the idea of universal vaccination is admittedly radical when viewed as a single policy jump, 
there is the distinct possibility that the cocaine vaccine could make incremental inroads into society.  Assuming it 
comes into widespread clinical use as a treatment tool, it is not a reach at all to imagine the drug courts in several 
states to order it along with ordering participation in a treatment program.  From there, it is a small step to impose 
the vaccine as a condition of supervised release.  If the vaccine were in widespread use as a condition of supervised 
release, encroaching on the welfare arena would not be unthinkable.  Finally, if the cocaine vaccine were already a 
familiar feature of society in these areas, application to any other group that is now subject to mandatory drug 
testing (high school athletes, certain employees, etc.) would not be radical at all. 
199
 There are numerous examples that could be used, of course, where occupations involve duties related to 
public safety on a grand scale (at least compared to most): airplane pilots, nuclear plant workers, emergency medics, 
municipal bus drivers, etc.  Many of these occupations already involve mandatory random drug testing and other 
intrusive measures (like the requirement that commercial airline pilots be American citizens). There is strong legal 
precedent upholding such infringements on personal privacy or autonomy, as one might expect; although the 
libertarian paternalist model does not address such situations or the rather foreseeable tendency for rule makers to 
take such institutional history as carte blanche to impose their judgments in other less applicable areas.  
200 See AIRPLANE! (Paramount Pictures 1980).  The scene mentioned above shows actor Lloyd Bridges 
playing flight traffic controller “Steven McCrosky.”
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when and where to approach and land passenger jets.  Jets carry hundreds of civilian passengers 
at a time; everyone knows the devastating casualties from airliner crashes.  
Due to these high stakes public policy concerns, it is well-settled law that the government 
may regularly conduct or require random drug testing of air traffic controllers.201  Few would 
object to this, and few would see an issue of paternalism here; the concern is not so much for the 
individual controller’s well-being as that of the scores of innocent lives hanging in the balance.  
Of course, a staunch libertarian might object that the testing is unnecessary, that the market left 
to itself would provide some mechanism for travelers to select airlines and airports where they 
trusted the tower controllers.  The transaction costs here seem prohibitive, however, and courts 
have upheld the testing.
What is interesting is that the cases arose in the first place; some airline employees found 
the testing objectionable enough to litigate and appeal their case to the Circuit Courts.202  The 
201
 The Appeals courts have repeatedly held drug testing government employees whose jobs involve public 
safety does not violate Fourth Amendment rights. The Ninth Circuit clearly expresses the prevailing thoughts of the 
courts: 
“Fourth Amendment requirements of a warrant and probable cause do not necessarily apply in the drug 
testing context. Rather, when a search serves special governmental needs, beyond the normal need 
for law enforcement, it is necessary to balance the individual's privacy expectations against the 
Government's interests to determine whether it is impractical to require a warrant or some level of 
individualized suspicion in the particular context.” 
Bluestein v. Skinner, 908 F.2d 451, 455 (9th Cir. 1990).
The need for dramatic measures in protecting the millions of citizens who travel via commercial airlines is grounded in 
past problems involving drug use in the airline industry.  In applying the precedent established by the Supreme Court in 
National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989), the Bluestein court held: 
“[T]he FAA administrative record included evidence that a number of pilots and other airline crew 
members had received treatment for cocaine overdoses or addiction; that tests by companies in the 
industry had turned up instances of drug use by pilots and mechanics; and that drugs were present in the 
bodies of pilots in two airplane crashes. Moreover, the harm that can be caused by an airplane crash is 
surely no less than the harm that might be caused by drug impairment in the course of Customs Service 
employment.” 
Bluestein 908 F.2d at 451.
202
 The cases discuss the petitioner’s legal arguments under the Fourth Amendment and the Administrative 
Procedures Act without offering a hint about why the requirement actually bothered anyone.  Note the cases were 
brought by a coalition of airline and airport employees, their unions, etc., so it is not clear how much of the litigation 
was driven by air traffic controllers themselves although they are the largest group subjected to the random testing.   
In American Fed’n of Gov’t Employees v. Skinner, 885 F.2d 889-890 (D.C.Cir.1989): 
“The Department identified as Category I personnel those employed in some twenty different 
positions relating to air, rail, highway, and water transportation. More than 94% of the employees 
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arguments addressed in the appellate opinions, of course, are entirely legal; there is no mention 
of what the petitioners found particularly objectionable about the requirements, except that they 
gave supervisors too much discretion to target certain employees unfairly.  It seems that to the 
individuals being tested, the requirements infringed on their personal privacy and autonomy; it 
was government intrusion, something closely associated with (and hard to distinguish from) state 
paternalism.
If the employees in jobs affecting public safety objected to the drug testing, one can 
imagine there would be objections and renewed litigation over mandatory immunizations to 
drugs like cocaine.  Yet the arguments would be the same on both sides: plaintiffs would assert 
that the practice was invasive, intrusive, and paternalistic, as well as unnecessary given that they 
are already drug-free due to regular testing.  The subject group, in fact, would undoubtedly see 
the vaccine as even more offensive than random urine testing.  A universal vaccine policy 
(within this class) would affect everyone, unlike random testing, which gives most people a 
break most of the time.  A shot that puts something into the body is in some sense more intrusive 
than a test of material that has left the body (although more hygienic for the administrators).203
subject to random testing under the plan work for the Federal Aviation Administration ("FAA"). 
As we noted earlier, nearly two-thirds of the covered employees occupy a single position, air 
traffic controller, and are not parties to this litigation.” 
This builds a case for paternalism in that the air traffic controllers apparently are more receptive of physical 
regulations and testing and thus would be less likely to oppose cocaine vaccination. .
203 In Dyrek v. Garvey, 334 F.3d 590, 599 (7th Cir. 2003) the FAA’s ability to have dominion over ones 
person through medical guidelines is evidenced through their treatment of air traffic controllers who develop 
diabetes. Although diabetes is a disqualifer of employment upon applying for an air traffic controller position, if one 
develops diabetes during employment the FAA has very strict guidelines for controlling the employees health. Id. at 
592. 
“The FAA also requested results from a general physical examination, a detailed report of Dyrek's 
insulin dosages and diet, verification that Dyrek had been educated in diabetes and its control and 
was willing and able to properly monitor and manage his diabetes, and a statement by Dyrek's 
specialist as to whether his diabetes would adversely affect his ability to safely control air traffic. 
Insulin treated diabetes is of particular concern in the air traffic control environment due to the 
potential for acute hypoglycemia induced central nervous system impairment as well as chronic 
complications involving the eyes, heart, kidneys, nervous system, and extremities.”
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 Regulators could argue that the public safety issues are exactly the same as those 
justifying drug testing for the same group, that there is evidence (sometimes tragic, involving 
deaths of others) of cocaine abuse by the airline employees involved, and that the drug testing is 
not foolproof or comprehensive.  The resources devoted to it (as well as the overall intrusiveness 
of the regime) might be better spent on vaccination that would actually ensure everyone involved 
was cocaine-free. Why allow any risk that air traffic controllers are using cocaine (as random 
testing permits), when a safe, clean method is available to eliminate the risk?  In addition, the 
argument raised in the litigation over the testing requirements—that it permitted so much 
discretion for supervisors that the tests could be used to harass employees wrongfully—would be 
completely moot if everyone had to get the TA-CD shot periodically.  Arguably, it is more fair, 
even if it is more intrusive.  
Here again, the libertarian paternalist model gives little guidance.  Should the objections 
of the subject class matter in this case?  What if the objectors garnered the support of the general 
public—would the model instruct that policy makers should ignore public and private resistance, 
if the public safety issues and cost-benefit analysis pointed in the direction of mandatory 
vaccinations?204
The same story would repeat itself, of course, for railroad employees, combat military 
personnel, public transit operators, nuclear facility employees, etc.205  Many of these occupations 
Id. at 595. If the FAA is allowed control over an employees’ autonomy regarding diabetes, it is not a great leap to 
allow them to administer a vaccine that would completely eliminate the possibility of the employee endangering the 
lives of passengers through the use of cocaine.
204 For further discussion of the doctrines regarding special needs exceptions to the usual requirements of 
the Fourth Amendment, especially regarding drug testing, see generally Robert D. Dodson, Ten Years of 
Randomized Jurisprudence: Amending the Special Needs Doctrine, 51 S.C. L. REV. 258 (2000), George M. Dery III, 
Are Politicians More Deserving of Privacy than Schoolchildren? How Chandler v. Miller Exposed the Absurdities 
of Fourth Amendment "Special Needs" Balancing, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 73 (1998).
205 In 1987, The Department of Transportation announced a plan for testing certain employees for unlawful 
drug use:
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involving high risks to the public already involve random drug testing, which some find 
understandably inconvenient or invasive; the cocaine vaccine would probably seem more 
invasive, but would offer more assurance of safety.  The public policy considerations have 
outweighed the intrusiveness of the drug testing, at least as far as the courts are concerned.  It is 
not clear how the scales would tip when a greater degree of safety could be achieved with a 
somewhat more intrusive procedure.206
In terms of the Hand Formula, B < Lp, where the “L” is astronomical (hundreds of deaths 
from an airliner crash, for example), and “p” varies drastically from very remote under normal 
circumstances to rather severe where one factor is altered, that is, a single employee is 
intoxicated with illegal drugs.  “B,” which in this case mostly represents the intrusiveness of 
requiring either drug testing or the vaccine, is somewhat unusual in this case, because it does not 
stand independent of p; B and p are interrelated. It is not clear how the scales would tip when a 
greater degree of safety could be achieved with a somewhat more intrusive procedure.   Figure 3 
may help illustrate my point:
Fig. 3
Public safety concerns
(B < Lp where”L” is astronomical/catastrophic, and “p” approaches zero with the vaccine)
“According to Executive Order 12,564, signed by President Ronald Reagan on September 15, 
1986, on- or off-duty illegal drug use by federal employees "evidences less than the complete 
reliability, stability, and good judgment that is consistent with access to sensitive information and 
creates the possibility of coercion, influence, and irresponsible action under pressure." 
Exec. Order No. 12,564, 3 C.F.R. 224 (1987), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 7301 note at 175-77 (Supp. IV 1986). The 
Order accordingly directed executive-branch agencies to establish mandatory programs to test employees in 
"sensitive positions" for the use of illegal drugs. The Department became the first executive agency to implement a 
drug-testing program pursuant to the President's Order.”  American Fed’n of Gov’t Employees v. Skinner, 885 F.2d 
884, 886-887 (D.C.Cir.1989). Included under this testing program were railway safety inspectors, motor vehicle 
operators, highway safety specialists and an exhausting list of other departmental positions from a wide variety of 
agencies including the United States Coast Guard, the Office of the Inspector General, and the Saint Lawrence 
Seaway Development Corp. Id. at 888.
206 See also National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 602 (1989).  Von Raab involved 
random drug tests of Customs agents specifically charged with catching illegal drugs being smuggled into the 
country; the agents also carried firearms and had access to classified materials.  The Supreme Court upheld the 
suspicionless searches.
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B measured in comparison with   Instit. history of  high 
alternative B’s that reduce L    intrusiveness
A policy maker’s prevailing concerns could be one of these three, all three, or some 
combination.  The point is that the Sunstein/Thaler model does not address situations like this, 
where the public safety concerns are so serious, which in the minds of some managers or 
lawmakers would justify almost any level of intrusiveness.  Complicating this issue is the fact 
that there may be less intrusive measures (like constant drug testing) that would be adequately 
effective, but less effective than the vaccine; it is not clear that the government is under a duty to 
find the least intrusive measures where public safety concerns are high (this was part of the 
Court’s reasoning for allowing mandatory vaccines in the early part of this century, as discussed 
earlier).  In addition, where there is an institutional and legal history of abnormally high 
intrusiveness, justifiably or not, there will be a tendency for those in charge to feel that the 
subject class is less entitled to object to infringements on their autonomy.
VII. CONCLUSION
The cocaine vaccine presents a challenging test case for any overarching approach to 
public policy; both vaccine and drug policies have always involved difficult balancing tests 
between public safety and personal autonomy.  The model of libertarian paternalism is promising 
because it relies on the identification of telltale circumstances in which the subject class typically 
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makes bad (contrary to self-interest) decisions.  Applying the model to the cocaine vaccine, 
however, illustrates some missing pieces: there is no consideration for similarly telltale biases of 
the decisionmakers themselves (moral judgmentalism, expectations of gratitude, etc.), or the 
problems of balancing libertarian values, paternalistic concerns about bad decisions, and public 
safety issues in a three-way equilibrium.  
From a purely legal standpoint, the Supreme Court has held consistently that the 
government can mandate immunizations, even over sincere individual objections.  The cocaine 
vaccine presents a new twist on this scenario, however, as it is not an inoculation against a 
contagious physical disease, like polio or smallpox.  It is not clear whether existing Supreme 
Court precedent would apply to the cocaine vaccine.  At the same time, courts have upheld 
mandatory drug testing in certain settings, and it seems likely that many of these settings would 
be situations where the cocaine vaccine (and similar vaccines against other drugs, once they are 
developed) might be used as a replacement for urine or blood tests.  The outcome of a legal 
challenge to the cocaine vaccines in such cases is uncertain.  It is time for the policy discussion 
to begin.
